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1. At its session of 10 July 1967 the Council of the Communities made a preliminary
examination of the applications for membership presented by the United Kingdom
Ireland and Denmark; there was also an exchange of views on the application that
Norway had announced it wo\lld be making. It was decided that the procedure laid
down in Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty and
Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty should be engaged. These Articles require the Council
to obtain the Commission s Opinion, which the Commission was accordingly requested
to submit.
2. The Commission, working from the point of view .of the Community interest, has
made a study of the problems raised by the applications under consideration. In
accordance with the intentions expressed in the Council, the study deals in particular
with the economic and institutional consequences that could be expected to ensue from
any extension of the Communities.
The Commission has, however, had to limit its observations in part to considerations
of a general nature and to assumptions. There will still be a number of open questions
of considerable importance for any assessment of the advantages and drawbacks for
the Communities, as long as no one knows just what will be the position of each of the
States c:onc:erned at the end of any negotiations undertaken. The Commission  like
the Council  is not at present in possession of all the information that is required -
if it is to express the Opinion called for by the Treaties. It would be pointless, indeed
dangerous, for the Community institutions to give a theoretical opinion without
knowing the possiblec:onditions and arrangements for ac:cession. The scale of the
. problems raised in different quarters is such that it is not at present possible to discern
as things stand, what these conditions and arrangements may in fact prove to be.
3. The Commission must therefore stress the preliminary character of the present
Opinion. It considers that if negotiations are undertaken it will, under the Treaties, be
entitled and in duty bound to develop its Opinion as the negotiations progress.
Consequently it is only once the concrete solutions that could be adopted are known
that it will be possible to work out the overall conclusions on the basis of which the
Commission can give, in full knowledge of the facts, the definitive Opinion called for
by the Treaty.
4. The Commission is aware that in the document it has prepared it does not cover
all the problems entailed by extension of the Community. Had it wished to do so, it
would have had to open conversations with the Governments of those States that are
candidates for membership.
The Commission has deemed it preferable to accept the risk of neglecting certain minor
problems on which the position of the candidates is either not exactly known or is
apparently analogous to that of the present Member States, and to give the Council all
the available information and elements of appreciation as regards both the general
problems raised by extension of the Communities and the main questions that would
be entailed in the various sectors of Community activity by the accession of the four
States which have so far applied for membership.TITLE I
GENERAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY EXTENSION OF THE COMMUNITY5. Four European .countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland Denmark and Norway,
have submitted fresh applications for membership. The United Kingdom s application
cannot be considered in isolation from that of the other three. Because of their
economic links with the United Kingdom, it would be difficult for these ~ountries to
contemplate joining the Community unless the United Kingdom also joins. But it
would be equally difficult for them to remain outside a Community enlarged to
include the United Kingdom.
6. The Community, for its part, cannot make an  a priori  selection from among the
applications from European countries that have free institutions, have reached a level
of development comparable to that of the present members and are willing to accept
unreservedly the. aims of the Six in regard to political union.
7. Several other European countries, in particular certain EFT A members, have
expressed their desire to open negotiations with the Community in order to establish
special relations with it.
In view of the association agreements already concluded by the Community and of the
negotiations already in progress, it must be pointed out that the applications for
membership in fact raise the problem of the economic organization of a large part 
Europe. .
8. The Community is thus faced with a choice of major importance on which the
future of the economic and  in the longer term  the political relations between
European States depends; the success of such an undertaking would constitute a decisive
step forward towards completion of the work for European unification that has been
going on since the end of the second World War.
This move would not, to be sure, be free from risks, particularly the risk of weakening
the cohesion of the Community. But unquestionably the Community must accept
certain risks where an undertaking of this importance, i.e. the achievement of European
unification, is to be attempted.
Of course its actions ought to be hedged around with every safeguard that can minimize
the risks. For this reason, the Communities ought, at the right moment, to decide upon
the guidelines to be followed in order that their extension may take place in favourable
conditions and in order to maintain a satisfactory degree of economic co-operation
with any c:ountries of western Europe that do not join the ' enlarged Community.
a) Scope of obligations of new members
9. Today, belonging to the Communities necessarily means accepting not only their
original charters  the Treaties  but also the objectives of political unification
affirmed in the Preambles to the Treaties of Paris and Rome (and recalled in the
conferences of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States held in Bonn
in July 1961 and in Rome in May 1967).
Similarly, new members will have to accept the decisions
1 taken since the Treaties
were adopted. These decisions are the fruit of an often hard-won compromise between
~ The word" decisions" is used here in a general sense and does not refer to the character of the
acts taken by the Community institutions. It also covers the agreements concluded with non-
member counrries.the Six, and they have also established an incontestable  de facto  solidarity betWeen them. It would be impossible and illusory to attempt to call them into question.
Consequently, as a general rule, a solution to the . concrete problems will have to be
sought by working out transitional measures and not by amending the existing rules.
10, Where economic union is concerned, the work of implementing the EEC Treaty
is less advanced than as regards the common agricultural and industrial markets. For
this reason, the first condition for entry- i.e. acceptance by new members of the rules
and objectives already decided upon by. the Community, subject to minor adjustments
that might have to be made  is not sufficient to ensure that the tasks remaining to
be accomplished will be carried to a successful conclusion. It therefore remains to
be seen whether the commitments provided for in the Treaties or already undertaken
by the present members are sufficient to guarantee the efficiency of the enlarged
Communities or whether, on the contrary, more precise commitments are necessary,
at least in certain sectors, as regards the aims to be achieved.
11. In certain fields measures have been envisaged or taken even when the texts were limited to mere statements of principle and embodied no detailed commitments. This
is the case, for example, as regards the arrangements for aid to coal-mining, for
medium-term policy, the international aspects of monetary policy, industrial policy, etc.
In each case, the further commitments accepted by the Member States arise out of
their general undertaking to establish an economic union among themselves. In this
they were responding to a real need born of the experience gained in implementing the
Treaties, without there having been any need to expand them in formal fashion. In
the normal way this should also happen in the enlarged Communities, particularly as
the applicant countries state that they are aware that they will be joining Communities
in process of development.
However, it would appear preferable to make sure  at least in certain essential fields  that these countries are willing, during the negotiations with the present
members of the Community, to define the objectives to be attained and, in broad
outline, the methods to be used. Foremost among such matters should be the questions
which would become more crucial and urgent if the Communities were enlarged.
12. In certain cases, the States wishing to join the Community should be willing to
join the present members in' accepting certain additional commitments so that the
Community may in fact be able to benefit from the "assets" which they  quite legitimately  do not fail to mention in support of their applications for membership.
In the absence of such commitments, these assets would be of no interest to the
Community. This latter consideration applies particularly to the United Kingdom
lead in certain fields of science and technology and to the positive contribution in this
field which this country could make to the Community once it was a member.
b) Working of the institutions in an enlarged Community
13. Any increase in the number of Member States necessarily means that the institu-
tional machinery of the Communities may become more cumbersome. That is why the
essential adaptation  which is, moreover, provided for in Article 237  must be
brought about in such a way as to maintain the efficacy of the system and thus offset
the mechanical effect of extension.The need to maintain and if possible to increase the efficiency and the role of the
institutional machinery in an enlarged Community is all the more obvious because it
is more difficult to build an economic union than to eliminate obstacles to trade in
accordance with hard and fast rules fixed in advance. On the contrary, economic
union calls for a host of harmonization operations, adjustments and decisions that
must be spaced out over a period of time and c;ould hardly be brought about without
adequate institutional machinery.
Unless due care were taken, an increase in the number and  in certain respects 
in the diversity of Member States could, by increasing the risk of conflicts of interest
make it more difficult to work out, adopt and implement decisions. If this were to
happen, the political and economic advantages of extension would prove illusory.
14. The first conclusion to be drawn from these general remarks is that in an enlarged
Community it would become even more necessary than in the present Community for
the institutional rules of the Treaties to be .applied without being weakened in any way.
Thus the balance which has grown up between the Community institutions and which
entrusts the Commission, in addition to its essential power of initiative, with responsi-
bility for supervisory and administration tasks in close liaison with the Council and the
Member States, would have to be fully safeguarded.
15. Where decisions 1 are taken by the Council on a proposal from the Commission, the
difficulties should not be unduly great if, on the one hand, the level of the qualified
majority is so fixed that it loses none of its power of dissuasion should a member be
tempted to prolong a debate indefinitely and if, on the other, the Commission is able to
play its full part in reconciling national interests at the stage when proposals are being
drawn up.
16. The decisions that require unanimity pose a more difficult problem. They
concern, in particular, the entry and association of non-member countries, the creation
of the Community s own resources, election of the Parliament by universal suffrage
amendment of the scales by which Member States contribute to budgetary expenditure,
harmonization of legislation, and new joint measures or common policies that need
to be initiated.
17. In many cases, it certainly seems that the conditions under which the Community
institutions operate will not be substantially altered by its extension. However
additional difficulties might arise when decisions have to be taken concerning the
harmonization of legislation or the elaboration of new measures or common policies.
In these fields, which will become increasingly important as economic unification
progresses, the greater diversity of interests between the members of the enlarged
Community might impair the efficacy of the institutions.
This danger could be reduced if during the negotiations for membership it were
possible to achieve a fairly broad consensus on the new measures, whether provided for
in the Treaties or not, which would be urgently needed in order that extension might
from the outset occur in the best possible conditions and the  de facto  solidarity necessary
for the smooth working of the enlarged Community be established among its members
as rapidly as possible,
In what follows, the various types of decision are examined on the basis of the EEC Treaty.~8.~ 'lna. '
.. 
Community consisting of a larger number of States, the Community
~~fi~tPisxn: would b~ more mena7ed by the tendency of th~ Member States to ~efuse
a,SSent to the majotlty pOint of View, even when thelf own Interests were not senously
involved, or to make their acquiescence in decisions which did not affect their interests
conditional on their obtaining c:oncessions in other fields. This is a serious problem
which would have to be solved during negotiations.
Furthermore, an improvement in the Council's practices , procedures and working
methods would be nec:essary if the efficiency of the institutions is to be maintained at
a sufficiently high level in an enlarged Community.
c) Problems raised by applications to negotiate made or likely to be made by
other European countries
19. If three EFTA member countries, including the United Kingdom, were to join
the Community, this would inevitably have repercussions on the situation of several
other European countries, in particular the remaining members of EFTA. (See Table
below.
In fact the applications for membership were followed by demarches on the part of
Sweden and Malta. The object of these has not been spelled out, but the Swedish
approach was accompanied by certain political reservations. The Swiss Government
too, has let it be known that it looked on its request of December 1961 as still
pending It must also be expected that if negotiations with the candidates for
membership do in fac:t begin, Portugal and Cyprus, which had submitted applications
for negotiations in 1962, and possibly Finland also, would in their turn express the
wish to conclude special agreements with the Community.
The opening of negotiations for membership would be sure to strengthen the deter-
m.ination of Austria and Spain to press forward their current negotiations with the
Community till they reached extensive preferential agreements.
20. Extension of the Community, and more particularly British membership, would
also have considerable repercussions on the Communitys relations with many. countries
in other continents, in particular the Commonwealth countries. In the light of the
association agreements already concluded or being negotiated by the Community with
non-European countries, these problems are also of great importance, particularly where
the developing countries are concerned; they will be dealt with in Title III.E
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.21. As regards Europe, the Community has always believed that membership was
the solution most in conformity with the aims of the Treaties for those democratic
c:ountries which have attained a sufficient degree of economic development.
22. On the other hand the southern European countries, whose level of development
precludes immediate membership, should be able to establish with the enlarged
Community preferential relations so conc:eived that their development would benefit.
However, it should be possible for these relations to take the form of an association
in the strict sense only where the countries concerned have free institutions; others
could be offered agreements in a number of stages, so that the Community could
take account of their subsequent evolution.
23. Other countries in central or northern Europe are also thinking of concluding
association or preferential agreements with the Community. The drawbacks of
, such agreements are well known, particularly in the case of advanced countries whose
prospects of later membership are nil or uncertain. NOt only might these countries
have in certain cases to conform with decisions in the taking of which they had
no part, but also commitments on consultation and the many special systems would
cause inextricable complications for the Community.
The Commission consequently considers that the Community should in principle
envisage such agreements only in cases where the road to membership is blocked
because of the international situation of the country c:oncerned; and even this it
should do only subject to every possible precaution in order to 
safeguard the complete
independence of its decisions and to avoid unduly complicating the harmonious
working of its customs union.
d) Problems involved in the actual entry of new members
24. Taking intO account the progress made in implementing the agricultural and
industrial common market and the problems of adaptation which arise, there can no
longer be any question of the new members "c:atc:hing up" in all fields on the
stages completed by the  Six  since 1 January 1958 so as to achieve "perfect" member-
ship of the Community by the end of the transitional period laid down in Article 8
of the Rome Treaty. It would seem logical that there should be a transitional
period of a few years.
25. Three remarks are essential on this point:
i) The aim of the transitional period will be to spread over a certain time the
economic consequenc:es that will inevitably follow when new members apply the
Community rules. Such an aim is not incompatible with the earliest possible
adoption by these members of the legal framework and of the instruments . estab-
fished by these rules, for the transitional adjustments will bear only on the economic
content, and they will have to disappear in accordance with a timetable fixed
in advance.
It seems, however, that the legal framework and the implementing machinery for
the agricultural market organizations .and the essential rules of the customs union
would have to be taken over immediately.
ii) Another question is whether it is possible and desirable  to envisage different
transitional periods for industry and agriculture. The Community has alwaysendeavoured to advance  pari passu  with the free movement of industrial goods and
the implementation of the common agrkultural market.  This  principle should be
maintained when new members join.
iii) Finally, if the starting date and duration of the transitional period and the
pace of progress within it had to be adapted to the individual problems of every
State which is at present a candidate for membership or association, or were to differ
from one product to another, the Community would encounter very serious diffi-
culties.
The best way to maintain a certain unity of the internal market in the enlarged
Community would be for the starting date, duration and pace of progress of the
transitional period to be the same for all the countries joining and for exceptional
arrangements to be kept to a minimum. It is partkulady necessary to observe this
principle when considering agricultural productS, since it would be difficult for the
Community' to make its market accessible, without transition, to Danish and Irish
products if the United Kingdom market were not being opened on the same terms
to the Community s products.
26. Since the establishment of a transitional period creates a timelag in application
of the Community regulations to new members, it must be asked whether or not
these new members should nevertheless be fully entitled to participate in the adoption
of decisions whkh would not be immediately applicable to them because of the
transitional arrangements from which they benefit.
This is a particularly difficult problem for which there is no point in seeking
a solution until we know how long the transitional period will be and what the
obligations. of new members. will be during that period.
e) Problems which would arise if new members did not join simultaneously
27. The preceding considerations were based on the assumption of the simultaneous
entry of the four States that have applied for membership.
Apart, from the difficulty there would be in establishing different transitional periods
for each new Member State, spacing out of accession would lead to institutional
complications out of proportion to the advantages it could have in other respects
for the prospect of further States entering could not be disregarded at the time, 
the first p.egotiations. It would therefore be necessary to work out both a temporary
system  suited to seven or eight Member States for example  and a final system
applicable after the last accession. Even then it would be necessary to ensure that
this final system would suit any member countries whose entry was held up.
28. There might be a temptation to overcome this difficulty by devising insti-
tutional formulas that could fit a variable number of Member States by linking the
number of votes in the Councilor the number of nationals of a member country in
the Commission with the number of inhabitants. Such a solution, of course, would
have the advantage of avoiding inevitably delicate negotiations with the new members
who would have to accept these rules as they stood. But it would present the
grave disadvantage, on acc:ount of its rigidity, of not allowing sufficiently exact
Deflection of trade, administrative complications (particnlarly in connection with the
control of origin), risks of error or dispute, etc.adjustment of the weighting arrangements to the relative numbers of big and small
States in the Community and to their actual dimensions.
29. For these reasons, a spacing out of negotiations rather than of entries should be
contemplated. The negotiations on institutional matters should nevertheless be held
simultaneously with all four States.
The principle should therefore be that the different acc:ession treaties, which will
necessarily be concluded and ratified at different dates, take effect simultaneously,
for example after ratification by the last of the parliaments concerned.
There would of course, have to be provisions to ensure that, if in the case of
one or more candidates the negotiations or ratificadons were to be delayed appreciably,
the accession of the other c:andidates was not held up.
f) Pursuit of ,the Community s normal activities
30. Lastly, the Communities cannot contemplate ceasing or even slowing down their
activities during the period of negotiations. In this respect it must be recalled that
important decisions were taken during the previous accession negotiations in
1961-1963. The new members will therefore also have to ac:c:ept measures adopted
during the negotiating period, measures which will concern both the completion
of the agricultural and industrial c:ommon markets and the establishment of the
economic union (e.g. implementation of commercial policy outside the tariff field
transport policy, fiscal policy, the decisions taken in the field 
of external relations, etc.
It is clear, however, that the conduct of membership negotiations parallel with the
pursuit of normal Community activities presents certain drawbacks; this consideration
argues in favour of the most rapid negotiations possible. In its study of what
may have to be added to the Treaties or subsequent decisions in the course of the
negotiations, the Commission has therefore confined itself to what appears indis-
pensable.
g) Problems arising from the merger of the Treaties
31. During the talks concerning the merger of the institutions .of the Communities
it was laid down that the negotiations for unification of the three Communities
would begin once the Treaty establishing a single Council and Commission had come
into force.
It follows from this that these negotiations might coincide, at least partially, with
the accession negotiations.
Although there may be advantages in carrying out the tWo operations at the same
time, the Commission is of the opinion that on~ should not hold up the other.
32. The Treaties of Paris and Rome provide specifically for the possibility' .of any
European State joining the Community after its establishment.
Moreover, in the Preamble to. the Treaty of Rome, the Founder States declared themselves: 
Determined to establish the foundations of an ever close union among the European
peoples " andResolved to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this
combination of resources and c:alling upon the other peoples of Europe who share
th~ir ideal to join in their efforts
It is in this spirit that the Community owes it to itself to examine the application
for' membership of any European country which subscribes to its principles and
objectives. '
33. From the political angle, the ac:cession of States whose political traditions of
stability and democracy are so long-standing and so deeply rooted would be of great
value for the Communities both as regards their internal development and in connec-
tion with the wider responsibilities they will have to bear in international life.
34. In the matter of political objectives, the events of rec:ent years have speeded
the change in the British attitude. Whereas in the past the United Kingdom
Government stressed the mainly, if not exclusively, economic nature of its interest
in the Communities, it not only declared today that it accepts the political objectives
of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, but in its recent declarations it has also shown
a particular interest in this fundamental aspect of the Communities.
The other candidates declare that they are also ready to accept the political objectives of the Treaty. 
35. Sweden, on the other hand, in its application of 26 July maintains the familiar
reservations concerning its policy of neutrality. This being so, the Commission
considers that membership for Sweden should be considered only if the negotiations
with that country showed that it was able to accept the Community s political aims
without reservation. The Commission is, however, aware of the fact that, should
this not be possible, the unity of the Nordic market established in the framework
of EFTA could be jeopardized. (In 1966 20%1 of Sweden s total exports went
to Denmark and Norway, as against 16% in 1960).
36. Extension of the common market to include countries whose level of develop-
ment is comparable with that of the Six would permit a better division of labour
greater ec:onomies of scale and further possibilities of mass production. It would also
have the effect of increasing the extent to which the national economies depended
on the Community as a whole.
The .actual value of these advantages can, however, be assessed only when it is
known how far the Community s dynamism can be maintained once it is enlarged.
The stimulating effect produced by the removal of obstacles to trade finds its limits
quite rapidly if it is not coupled with and carried further by the construction of
a genuine economic union which allows firms to adapt their organization and
activities to the new dimension of the market and consequently to derive maximum
benefit from it. If this complementary factor is lacking, even the elimination of
obstacles to trade remains precarious. Consequently, the Commission must stress
once again the need to maintain .and, if possible, strengthen the effectiveness of
the institutions in the expanded Community.
37. As a result of the extension, the Community s economic potential would
moreover, be close to that of the world's leading economic power. The aggregate
gross national productl of the United Kingdom
, Ireland, Denmark and Norway for
Half these exports consisted of industrial finished products. 2 i.e. total goods and services available.1965 is equal to about 40% of the Community s GNP. The entry of these four
countries would have the effect of bringing the Common Market s GNP up to about
60% of that of the United States. The consequences that would inevitably arise
in relations with the various trade partners of the expanded Community are examined
in Title II (chapter dealing with custOms union) and Tide III, (external relations).
38. At the present stage it is still very diffkult for the Commission to make an
overall assessment of the problems arising from the accession of other States.
Only during the negotiations and on their conclusion will the Commission be able to
judge whether it will be possible in an enlarged Community to maintain the indispen-
sable cohesion and dynamism. The Commission is aware that theSe are qualities
whkh are also dependent on other factOrs not directly related to extension of the
Community: convergence or divergence of the Member States' national polides and
in particular, but not exclusively, their foreign and defence policies, and again the
resemblance or difference betWeen their ideas on the basic aim or institutional
development of the Community. These considerations lead the Commission to
stress, once more the preliminary nature of the opinion which it is in a position to
give the Council today.
t The comparison (see following table) is based on national accounting data converted into
dollars at current rates of exchange. The results must therefore be considered simply as
orders of magnitude. Likewise this comparison based on a single year may reflect economic
trends which vary from one country to another.a) Totals b) in $
in $'000 m. per head of population
EEC EEC
EEC USA EEC USA
Denmark Denmark
Norway Norway
Ireland Ireland
Expenditure generating national product  1965
Private consumption 181. 257.. 433. 001 039 227
Public consumption 43. 63. 125. 240 255 644
military ll. 17. 52. 269
civilian 32. 45. 72. 178 184 375
Gross fi%ed asset formation 69. 91. 7 ll8. 382 371 610
of which:
plant and machinery 30. 40. 44. 166 165 230
Change in stocks
Trade in goods and services
export 1 64. 92. 39. 352 374 200
import 1 61.2 89. 32. 337 362 164
GNP at market prices 299. 418. 692. 651 692 3 558
Net investment  1965
Gross fi%ed asset formai-"'Jn 69. 91.7 ll8. 382 371 610
Depreciation 28. 38. 67. 159 154 347
Net investment 40. 53. 51.2 223 217 263
a) Totals
000 m.
b) in $
per person employed
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Gross national product  1965
21.3 26. 22. 760 I 873 4 917
ll5. 162. 244. 3 563 3 533 10 325
123. 173. 359. 4 255 3 985 180
Total 259. 362. 626. 3 539 3 499 8 676
Sources:  SOEC - Basic Statistics of the Community, 1966. OECD - National Accounts Statistics, 1956-1965.
1 Including factor income to or from rest of world.TITLE II
CUSTOMS UNION AND ECONOMIC UNION
2.3Chapter 
The customs union
39. According to Article 9 of the EEC Treaty, the Community is based upon a
customs union. It is on this foundation that the general objectives set Out in
Article 2 are gradually being ' achieved, largely by means of the common policies.
The experience gained in the last few years of Community activities confirms that
the customs union is the key to the establishment and the development of the
Community.
Every precaution must therefore be taken to make sure that the accession of new
States interferes neither with the component parts nor with the working of the
customs union, and that the negotiations and later the unavoidable transitional
arrangements do not result in the postponement of the decisions which the Com-
munity still has to take before the customs union is fully established. (See the
introduction to the Tenth General Report on the Activities of the Community).
a)  New dim ens ion s 0 f the c u s tom s un ion
40. The accession of four new members would lead to a considerable expansion
of the volume of trade within the common market and with non-member countries.
On the basis of the figures for 1965, intra-Community trade (exports fob from each'
Member State to every other Member State) would rise from $20500 million for
the Six to $32 000 million for the enlarged Community.
For the same year exports fob to non-member countries would rise from
$27 000 million for the present Community to $34 000 million for the enlarged
Community, and imports df from non-member c:ountries would rise from
$29 000 million to $40 000 million. These figures show that extension of the
Community would considerably enhance its position as a major world importer
(+ 
39%). The expansion in the volume of its exports would be less 
(+ 
27%).
41. These figures do not of course make allo~ance for the e:x:pansion of preferential
trade which would result from the gradual elimination of customs duties and other
obstacles to trade within the enlarged customs union. Although it cannot be
expected that this expansion would be as rapid as that experienced in the EEC
between 1958 and 1965 (from $7000 million to $21000 million), the obstacles
to trade having already been eliminated inside the EEC on the one hand and
inside EFT A on the other, it can be assumed that extension 'of the customs union
would contribute to economic expansion in western Europe.
b)  Elimination of obstacles to intra- Community trade
42. Obstacles to trade already eliminated in the Community at the date of accession
would have to be eliminated from trade between the old and the new members
during a transitional period. This applies of course not only to customs duties and
quantitative restrictions but also to taxes or other measures with effect equivalent to
these duties and restrictions.In the accession treaties, the new members would have to assume specific obligations
regarding the abolition of any measures of this type at present known and in force
on their respective territories. , Unilateral measures of the type adopted by the
United Kingdom in 1964 with a view to restoring equilibrium in its balance of
payments1 would, of course, be ruled out.
State monopolies of a commercial nature2 would also have to be adjusted as provided
for by the Treaty of Rome.
43. The problem of manufactures based on certain agricultural products, which is
dealt with in Regulation 160/67, also calls for spedal attention: the system at present
used in the Community should be applied in dealings with the new members 
long as these do not fully apply the provisions of the common agricultural policy
for the products used as raw materials. This problem is of spedal importance
in view of the very appredable extent to which the processing industries of certain
candidates are likely to compete with the food industry of the Six.
44. The membership agreements cannot rule out the use of safeguard measures,
which allow of exceptions to the rule of free movement of goods where there are
econo.r.p.ic difficulties or deflection of trade. These measures, similar to those in
Articles 115 and 226 of the EEC Treaty, would be laid down for the trahsitional
period by the accession treaties. The present members of the Community would
of course have to constitute one unit for the application of these measures after the
expiry of the present Community s own period of transition.
The increase in the number of member countries and the greater diversity of their
economies could mean more frequent resort to safeguard measures unless it were
possible to avoid these by the co-ordination of commercial and industrial polides 
which will have to be undertaken.
45. The elimination  even if it were gradual  of the obstacles to trade in an
enlarged Community could give rise to certain difficulties in some "sensitive sectOrs
which were singled out for special treatment in the Kennedy Round.
The enlargement of the market should help to step up productivity and enc:ourage
necessary adaptation, but the conditions of competition must not be distorted. Diffi-
culties can be foreseen, for instance, in the paper and paperboard industry, because
of the privileged acc:ess of the Nordic countries to the raw material and the carteli-
zation of the Scandinavian paper industry. The very considerable divergences of
commercial and industrial policy between the United Kingdom and the Community
in an industry such as textiles could also raise delicate problems for the Community
industry, which will in any case, as a c:onsequence of agreements recently c:oncluded
in Geneva, have to leave a growing part of the market to imports from the
developing countries. Excessive differences in energy costs would prevent the
Community ferro-alloy industry from coping with Scandinavian competition.
Lastly, particular attention will have to be paid to the problems arising from the
extent of American investment in certain areas of British industry, such as the
motOr and agricultural tractor industries.
In order to remedy the foreseeable difficulties in sensitive sectors such as those of
which examples have been given above, measures of industrial policy' will have to
15 % surcharge applied even to imports from itsEFTA partner countries.
This would .seem to be applicable to the United Kingdom coal importing arrangements.be taken to facilitate indispensable adaptation. If in exceptional cases co-ordination
of policies should not permit the causes of distortion to be eliminated, special
transitional or adaptation measures might prove to be necessary.
c)  A P P Ii cad 0 n 0 f the com m 0 n c us t 0 IDS ta ri ff (C C T )
46. The present candidates for membership appear to be willing to adopt the
common customs tariff as well as the rules in this field contained in the Treaty of
Paris. It is equally indispensable that they should accept the provisions for its
uniform application which will meanwhile have been adopted.
47. During the transitional period which they will be granted, the special position
of the new members in relation to the present members of the Community will
inevitably pose delicate problems. These difficulties would be greatly reduced if
the pace at which the CCT is introduced and that at which the mutual reduction
of customs duties is implemented are fixed in such a way as to limit the possibi-
lities of deflection of trade.
48. At the same time and for the same period, the conditions under which the
new members would relinquish the EFT  tariff arrangements would have to 
determined from the point of view of the Community
s interests.
49. The application of theCCT by the United Kingdom would mean a fundamental
change in trading conditions betWeen the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth
Commonwealth preferences being replaced by Community preferences. For this
reason the ,British decision to accept the CCT is qualified by a reference to the
provisional agreements reached in the course of the 1961-63 negotiations (association
of c:ertain Commonwealth countries and territories in Africa and the Caribbean
far-reaching commercial agreements with India, Pakistan and Ceylon).
The problems raised by the relations of an enlarged Community with the countries
of the Commonwealth are dealt with in Title III.  In  this context reference
should, however, be made to the delicate problems these relations might raise for
certain sectors.
50. Lastly, by declaring its willingness to accept the CCT as it emerges from
the Kennedy Round, the United Kingdom appears to be prepared to drop its demand
for nil duties for various products which had given rise to difficulties in the previous
negotiations. The question arises, however, of the pace at which the United
Kingdom would be prepared to bring its tariff closer to the CCT for the products
concerned.
In  this respect it should be remembered that the free movement of goods within
the Community calls for the removal of national tariff quotas or their replac:ement
by Community measures.
51. To sum up, in order that the extension of the Community should not jeopardize
the establishment of the customs union, the arrangements involved and in particular
the proposed transitional period will have to be re-examined once the intentions
of the countries applying for membership are better known.When the exact import to be attached to their acceptance of the common customs
tariff comes to be examined, it would also be advisable to study the situation with
regard to certain products or particularly important sectOrs where acceptance of the
CCT cannot assume its full signific:ance unlesS' coupled with acceptanc:e of a certain
number of basic options in commercial or industrial policy.
d)  Problems of commercial policy
52. Independently of the ac:ceptance by the new members of the elements of a
common commercial policy already adopted by the Six in connection with the
establishment of other common policies, partic:ularly the agrkultural policy, the nego-
tiations on memberhsip  as already indic:ated in Title I  should not be allowed
to delay adoption of the regulations already submitted to the Coundl under the
action programme it adopted on 25 September 1962.
It may be noted that the system governing imports has in any case been liberalized
all over Europe, except in respect of a very small number of sensitive products still
subject to quantitative restrictions and of dealings with State-trading countries, for
which the western countries are still seeking suitable methods of economic: and
C01l1merdal co-operf!.tion.
Lastly, neither the partidpation of, the enlarged Community in certain multilateral
agreements nor the working out and implementation of the c:ommon commerdal
policy should on the whole cause major problems for the new members.
Tariff policy questions are dealt with in Title I and Title II.
See White Paper "Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of
the European Communities , sees, 38 to 40. Cmnd. Paper No. 3301, HMSO.Chapter  2 .
AgricultUral policy
53. Agriculture is the Community sphere in whkh integration has made the
greatest progress. The common agricultural policy is now very largely complete,
especially with regard to price polic:y and the organization of agrkultural markets;
co-ordination of domestic policies on structure has begun; the system of State aids
is now at the final stage of discussion in the Council.
This policy is the result of long and difficult negotiations. Its effect is to strengthen
the  de facto  solidarity uniting the Six and its success ensures that progress will be
achieved in other Community sectors as well.
~ Any calling into question of the essential features of this policy upon the accession
of new members is therefore ruled out. In the c:ourse of the future implementation
and further development of the agricultural policy, the Community might, however
consider certain adjustments which might have to be made in order to allow both
for the new factual situation resulting from enlargement and for a number of
interests or specific problems peculiar to the new Member States for which there
was agreement that Community solutions were necessary.
a)  Quantitative and qualitative changes in the basic data
concerning agriculture in an enlarged Community
54. Compared with the natural and structural output potential of the present
Member States, that of the "Four" is relatively small.
The agricultural area exploited would be about 30% greater in the "Ten" than
in the "Six As average farm holdings in Great Britain and Denmark are larger
than in the "Six , the increase in the number of farms (of one hectare or more)
would be only some 20%. The increase in the number of farm workers would be
even less (16%).
Farms, more especially in Denmark but in the United Kingdom and Irela1;l.d too, are
run on relatively rational lines and noted for high productivity. This comes out
also in the figures for the value of production and value added in these countries;
whereas the, value of agricultural production in the "Four" is 26% of that of ,the
Six , the value added per person employed in the "Four" (2 880 u. is over
1 000 u.a. higher than in the "Six" (1 770 u.
Consequently, agriculture s contribution to the aggregate national product of the
Four" (nearly 6%) is relatively high when compared with the proportion of farm
labour in the tOtal labour force (6%), while in the "Six" its contribution (8%) is
much lower when compared with the percentage of the labour force employed (16%):
This shows that the level of agricultura incomes in' the " Four is higher than in
the " Six
55. With regard to the supply .of agricultural products, the situation of the "Six"
should not be appreciably altered by accession of the "Four , if one may judge
from the supply situation of 1965/66.
See table appended to this Chapter.Whereas among the "Six" the average self-sufficiency rate just reaches 90%, 
would be about 85 % in the "Ten This slight difference arises from the fact
that in the "Four" there are tWo small countries with agricultural surpluses (Denmark
and Ireland) and One large importing country (the United Kingdom).
56. The following would be the biggest changes in. the rate of self-sufficiency in
the various products (taking the 1965-1966 statistics as a basis):
in 
Decreases Six Ten
Decreases
Wheat
Rice
Sugar
Fresh fruit
Citrus fruit
Fresh vegetables
Mutton and lamb
Butter
Cheese
110
102
102 84 1
Increases
Coarse grains
Beef
Poultrymeat
Pigmeat 103
1 Allowance has not of course been made for the United Kingdom s commitments to the Commonwealth (See sees, 65
and 66 below).
It is therefore mainly in cereals-based livestoc:k products that the self-sufficiency rate
of the "Ten" would be higher.
These self-sufficiency rates may in future undergo certain changes to the extent'
that implementation of the common agricultural policy has repercussions on the
volume of production in the enlarged Community.
57. In the matter of prices and price ratios at producer level, the prices ruling in
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark are fairly low compared with the common
prices of the "Six leaving aside the basically different support system for British
agriculture. On the other hand, producer prices in Norway are relatively high.
Price relationship at producer level among the "Four are also different from
those found in the "Six
30'58. The following conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of changes in the
basic data:
i) Those rules (especially those relating to organization 
of the market and policy
on prices and financing) which are mainly determined by the supply position, will
not c:ome up against a fundamentally changed situation once the Community has
been enlarged, even if some adjustment might be advisable for a few products.
ii) Adoption of the common agricultUral policy and the price ratios now laid down
for the "Six" could produce changes in the pattern of production in the new member
- countries bec:ause of their different price ratios. Assessment of the possible conse-
quences of any such changes could be profitably attempted only in 
co-operation with
the countries concerned.
59. In short, although extension of the Community would affect the orders of
magnitUde of the basic data, it would be unlikely to change the sitUation fundamentally,
, by itself, to make a revision of the common agricultural policy inevitable. Such
changes as might be necessary could be introduced in the course of the future
implementation and further development of this policy.
However, certain natural, structUral or social difficulties which may exist 'in some
border areas of the new member countries of the enlarged Com~unity will make it
more urgent to complete the structural side of the common agricultural policy.
b)  Specific problems of countries applying for member-
ship
60. Application of the common agricultural policy, as worked out by the Commu-
nity, to countries whose agricultural policies have been different in many respects
may confront these countries with certain specific problems, quite apart from the
financial question.
United Kingdom
61. A comparison of agricultural prices in the EEC with producer prices in the
United Kingdom shows that prices are sometimes higher, sometimes lower, and that
for certain products these differenc:es are considerable.
Since the United Kingdom will have to fall into line with the generally higher
Community pric:es and different price pattern there will, as pointed out above, be
problems of adjustment.
Furthermore! the United Kingdom has price guarantees for some products for which
no such provision is made under the common agricultural policy (eggs, mutton
potatoes, wool).
62. The application of the EEC agricultural price system and price level (involving
the abandonment of the deficiency payments system), the application of levies to
products imported from non-member countries, and payment for products from the
EEC at the internal market price are bound to cause a rise in the consumer prices
of a number of important foods. The prices of other foods, notably liquid milk
fruit, vegetables, and mutton and lamb, appear unlikely to change appreciably. For
certain products (eggs and potatoes) there may even be a fall.Various studies made on the subject indicate that in general the rise in living
costs can be put at some 3%.
63. The British farmer seems to attach great importance to the annual price review
which is based on an analysis of the agricultural situation made by the Government
in consultation with representatives of farming interests.
Apart from certain differences betWeen the methods of c:ompiling data on the
agricultural situation in the United Kingdpm and the Community, there is an impor-
tant difference in the consultation proc:edure prior to the annual price fixing:
i) In the United Kingdom, official consultation takes place with farmers' organi-
zations, while in the Community the contacts are only informal. The Community
procedure, on the other hand, includes consultation of the European Parliament on
the price proposals submitted by the Commission to the Council;
ii) In the United Kingdom the object of the procedure is to fix guaranteed producer
prices, usually ensured by means of deficiency payments, so that market prices are
. not affected, while the Community fixes target prices for the market, directly
affecting the economy in general. Therefore any official consultation of the social
groups concerned could not be restricted to farmers' organizations.
64. As regards the United Kingdom s relations with the Commonwealth countries
in the agricultural sector, two problems appear to need partic:ular attention: the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and, essentially, butter from New Zealand.
65. The United Kingdom is bound by its obligations under the Commonwealth
Sugar Agreement to buy a specified amount of sugar at a negotiated price. The
current commitment is for approximately 1.8 million tons and the price is about
120 U'a' per ton, or double the world market price. In addition to this quantity
at a negotiated price, the British market absorbs a further 0. million tons of
Commonwealth sugar at the world price. This sugar benefits from a preferential
rate of duty on imports into the United Kingdom.
Commonwealth imports cover more than two-thirds of the United Kingdom s sugar
requirements. The output of beet sugar, which is strictly controlled by a system
of production licences, is approximately 0.9 million tons.
It may be mentioned in this connection that the supply position of the Six is
already in surplus. This surplus, which has a tendency to increase will be
800 000 tons towards 1970, and it would be possible to use only about half of it
for purposes other than human consumption. Moreover, it is estimated that in
a few years the Yaounde countries and overseas countries and territories will be
in a position to export some 100000 tons.
The term of validity of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (until the end of
1974) coincides approximately with the period during which the common organization
of sugar markets still provides that i:he quotas limiting price and marketing guarantees
be allocated among the several Member .States. The arrangements that will apply
in the Community at the final stage will thus come into force after the expiry
of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.66. The British market represents virtually the only outlet for butter from New Zealand, some 85% of whose butter exports go to the United Kingdom. The trade agreement at present in force is valid until 30 September 1972 and stipulates a minimum quantity of 172 700 tons of butter to be imported from New Zealand under quota arrangements. These imports cover more than a third of the United Kingdom s requirements, which amount to approximately 470 000 tons. Three Member States (France, Belgium and the Netherlands) benefit from quotas totalling 20 000 tons. Norway, Ireland and Denmark have been authorized to supply 132 000 tons, while the quotas of "third parties" amOunt to 120 000 tons (Australia. accounting for 68000 tons). Home production supplies about 30 000 tons.
The situation in' the Six is that the present Community has structural surpluses which, according to the forecasts, will amount to between 150000 and 160000 tons
by the end of the 1967-1968 marketing year. The butter problem is complicated by the fact that extension of the common agricultural policy to the United Kingdom will c:ause a rise in consumer prices and possibly an increase in that c:ountry own production of butter.
The real difficulties connected with Commonwealth sugar and New Zealand butter will have to be solved in the courSe of the negotiations.
2.  Ireland
67. Agriculture holds a very special place in the Irish economy. It gives employment to almost one third of the labour force and accounts for more than 20% of the GNP. Farm products alone  beef and cattle being the most important  account for almost two thirds of the tOtal value of goods exported. The main importer is the United Kingdom. The adaptation of agriculture is complic:ated by the pattern
of farming based on small holdings and the .1;elative over-population of the western
part of the country,
68. For most products the alignment of Irish producer prices on Community price
levels will result in rises of varying extent both at producer and c:onsumer level.
slight reduction in sugar-beet prices might, however, be expected while prices for potatOes and eggs could remain unchanged.
3.  Denmark
69. Denmark has one of the most advanced and productive agricultural economies in the world. A large proportion of its produc:tion is e:x:ported.
70. Generally speaking, agricultural prices are considerably lower in Denmark than in the EEC (1967/68). Their alignment on EEC prices will result in c:onsiderably increased earnings for Danish agriculture, even allowing for higher feed-grain prices and the suppression of certain aids.
The applicat!on of the common agricultural policy will also mean an ,increase in consumer pnces.4.  Norway
71. In Norway the fishing industry and forestry are of importance as well as
farming (contribution to GNP: farming 5%, forestry 2.4%, fisheries 1.7%). Nor-
wegian agriculture is carried on under particularly unfavourable natural and structural
conditions (the area of the average farm is 5 ha); it could not survive in the northern
part of the country without substantial support from the State. In its efforts to
maintain a minimum of population in these areas, Norway has not as yet been able
to dispense with aid of this kind. Livestock products are the major item in agri-
cultural production (80% ,of total inc:ome, 50% of which is accounted for by milk
products) .
72. The alignment of Norwegian producer prices on CO!Ilffiunity prices could lead
to a reduction in the earnings of Norwegian agriculture.
73. However, the lowering of producer pric:es in Norway would not mean a reduc-
tion in consumers' expenditUre. On the contrary, the removal of consumer subsidies
and the rise in pric:es for imported goods would lead to a certain increase in consumer prices. 
74. The problems which must be faced by the new members (c:hanges in prices
levels, struc:ture of price ratios, revision of aid arrangements) rule out any possi-
bility of the common agricultural policy being adopted by these countries immediately
membership becomes effective.
Apart, then, from the need for administrative adjustment, a transitional period must
be envisaged for reasons connected with .economic adaptation.
c)  Financial problems
75. As in the other spheres of agricultural policy, extension of the Community
must not interfere with the principles on which the financing of the common
agricultural policy is based, Le.
i) The Community financial responsibility for the guarantees on pric:es and
markets offered by the market policy;
Ii) Providing the Community with funds to finance measures to improve the
structure of agricultUre.
76. The extension of the Community will result in heavier spending by the EAGGF.
This inc:rease will be due, in particular, to the larger sums needed to cover refunds
intervention measures and direct aid to agricultUral production in the new member
countries, as well as for the increase in activity under the Guidance Section of the
Fund. Some of this increase will be offset by savings on refunds now payable
on exports from the Six to the future member countries.
Subject to all the reservations required in such calculations, a preliminary estimate
of the order of magnitUde of the sums which the EAGGF will have to administer
in 19701 gives the following figures:
1. In this study 1970 is taken as the year when, hypothetically, the single market for agricultural
products would be in operation not only for the Six (the existing Community) but also for the
Ten (the existing Community plus the United Kingdom, Danemark, Ireland and Norway). The
estimates make no allowance for possible changes in the volume of production and of net
imports that might occur in an enlarged Community, as these cannot at present be forecast.Estimate for 1970
(in million u.
Expenditure EAGGF Six Ten
Difference
between
Six and Ten
Guarantee Section
Guidance Section
1 355
285
1 480
(350)
125
(65)
Total 1 640 1 830 190
These estimates' are essentially static and are based, as far as quantities and prices are
concerned, on the situation in the years 1965 to 1967. Allowance has, however, been
,made for certain changes in the pattern of imports in the direc:tion of an expansion of
the present volume of intra-Community trade.
77. A preliminary estimate of EAGGF revenue, again for 1970 and again with all
due reservations, gives the following figures:
Estimate for 1970
(in million u.
Receipt EAGGF Six Ten
Difference
between
Six and Ten
Levies 600 1 400 800
Other receipts 1 040 430 610
Total 640 1 830 190
Virtually the entire increase in revenue from levies will come from the United Kingdom
which, because of its extensive imports of agricultural products, would raise about
770 million u.a. under this heading. This then would give rise to a problem of
balance in the sharing of financial burdens. The search for this balance cannot
however, be allowed to interfere with the principle of at least 90% of the total amount
of levies charged on imports of agricultural produce being appropriated' by each
Member State for Community uses. If this principle were allowed to go by the board
the enlarged Community would be forced to introduce a system of checking of the
final destinations of imported agricultural products, a step which would mean that
the free movement of these goods was rendered meaningless.  In  addition to this, the
importing States, and the United Kingdom in particular, would retain a financial
interest in obtaining their supplies outside rather than inside the Community.It will therefore be necessary for old and neW members to come to an agreement on
this point in the negotiations.
Should such an agreement do no more than 
set  up a temporary system, this' system
must not be fragile and must be maintained in force till a permanent system is introduced. 
The search for a suitabl~ balance between the finanCial burdens borne by old and
new members must no,t, of course, be limited to the agricultural sectoJ;.S
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.CHAPTER 
Economic and financial problems
78. The economic and financial p,roblems raised by extension of the Community
differ from one candidate for membership tJO another.
For three of them (Denmark, Ireland and Norway), the pursuit of basic economic
policy aims of the typeset out in Articles 2 and 104 of the Treaty of Rome has not
so far brought up problems differing very much from those which the present members
of the Community have had to face. Growth rates in these three countries have in
the past few years been comparable with those of industrialized countries in general
and there have not been any serious balance-of-payments difficulties.
79. Given the opportUnities for adaptation offered by transitional arrangements, there
would probably be no appreciable change in the sitUation of these three countries if
they joined the Com.munity. Moreover, the scale of their ec:onomies is such that
such difficulties as' might arise could have no more than a 11iarginal effect on the
Community as a whole. Hence, without prejudice to the fuller investigation that
would have to be made later on in respect of each of the candidates, the problems
raised by their membership do not call for individual analysis in this chapter.
80. On the other hand, the difficulties that have beset the United Kingdom economy
over the last twenty years make it imperative to study the problems that would have
to be resolved before that country could, where economic policy and the balance of
payments are concerned, effectively pursue the objectives laid down by the Treaty
of Rome.
A. Economic situation of the United Kingdom
81. Experience has shown time and again that in the United Kingdom there is a
recurrent conflict  much more serious than elsewhere  between achievement of
a growth rate comparable to the annual average attained over a period of several
years in most other industrialized countries and the need to balance external pay-
ments  also over a period of several years.
On several occasions the British ecopomy, as soon as its growth rate drew close to
that of other industrialized countries, began to show signs of a payments crisis.
Sooner or later the authorities, threatened with exhaustion of international monetary
resources, and having made heavy calls on international monetary co-operation, were
forced not only to adopt a deflationary policy so severe that it virtUally brought
economic growth to a standstill but also to take action to restrict international transaction
in goods, services and capital.
It is not possible in this chapter to analyse in detail the causes of the economic
disequilibrium that has affected the United Kingdom !nrecent years. Many studies
of the problem, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, suggest that the difficulties
stem not only from cyclical swings in economic: activity  which could be eliminated
by following a more effective policy for the establishment of equilibrium. The
difficulties in ' fact seem, to be mainly structural in origin, and stem' either from
defects in the distribution of productive resources (inadequate and misdirected invest-
ment, numerous obstacles to improvement of produc:tivity, the pattern of employmentthe tax system) or from the economic, monetary and financial burdens inherited from
the country s past, the second world war and the country s international position
in the postwar world. It would be difficult, however, to say which of all these
factors are mainly responsible for the present situation.
Generally speaking, it may be said that although the British economy recently
emerged from the strained situation in which it had been since 1963/64, its basic
situation is much the same as in similar phases in the past.
82. At home, measures to curb demand c:aused productive industrial investment to
stagnate in 1966, and even to register an appreciable decline in 1967. Thus a
familiar and ominous pattern is being reproduc:ed: payments difficulties due at least
in part to inadequate expansion of productive capacity have again forced the au.tho~
rities to p~rsue a policy, one effect of which has been to jeopardize expansion in
the longer term and so to strengthen the propensity to import. Unless means of
resolving the dilemma are found, this cause-and -effect sequence harbours in itself the
seed of future crises. Furthermore, wage restraint and the current and foreseeable
extent of unemployment are creating a sodal situation that makes it considerably more
difficult to apply the right economic policy mix: the situation may call for measures to
stimulate the economy, but action to this end is hampered by the United Kingdom
delicate external payments situation.
83. Between 1964 and 1966 the United Kingdom s "basic defidt (Le. aggregate
deficit on current and 1011g-term capital transactions) was reduced considerably. This
reflects the combined impact of the deflationary policy imposed on the economy
and of the restrictions to wl1ich transactions with abroad were subjected (the special
import surcharge  now abolished  restrictions on allowanc:es for holidays abroad
controls on exports of c:apital, etc.).
The improvement in the external situation as shown in the accounts was particularly
marked during the last quarter of 1966 when the basic balance showed a surplus
of no  ~ess  than $381 million. However, this was due  partly, at least  to seasonal
and fortuitous factors.
Recent official information2 shows that this improvement has not been maintained
and that the United Kingdom s payments situation deteriorated in the first and second
quarters of 1967, with a basic defidt of the order of $39 million in the first quarter
and of $120 million in the second. 
United Kingdom basic balance of payments
(in  million)
Basic deficit (1 + 2)
1964 1965
1 126 ~308
1 047 650
- 2 173 958
1966
Current balance
Balance of long-term capital
165
325
490
II Source: HM Treasury, press release of 13 September 1967.84. The balance of short-term capital (not induded in the figures given above)
showed a trend similar to that of the basic balance. Towards the end of last year
and at the beginning of this year, substantial net rec:eipts were recorded as a result of
a heavy influx of funds returning to London; these provided the authorities with a
large part of the funds needed to payoff some of the debts c:ontracted since the
latest series of exchange crises began in the autumn of 1964.
During the second quarter of this year there were net outflows of funds, particularly
after the conflict in the Middle East broke out. Once again, the Bank of England
sought assistance from the central banks of va.dous countries.
85. The information that has been available on developments in the last few months
suggests that there is again a tendency for the payments situation to deteriorate.
Current forecasts are that for the full year 1967 the payments balance will again
show a defidt. These prospects will tend to mean that the United Kingdom will have
more difficulty in repaying its debts than appeared likely at the beginning of the year.
86. Fluctuations that may occur in the sterling balances are another source of
concern. The sterling balances are all the liquid sterling assets held in London by
public authorities, firms and private persons resident outside the United Kingdom
whether as reserves, as working balances or as a means of financing transactions of
various kinds. Considered as a whole, these claims have fluctuated relatively little
since the war. At the end of June 1967 the gross amount (excluding balances held
by international organizations) was some f4600 million ($12800 million). Sixty-
seven percent of this (f3 100 million, or $8 600 million) is held by creditors in the
sterling area  more than half being "offidal" holdings. The remaining 33%
cn 500 million, or $4 200 million) is held by creditors resident in other countries ---
the bulk being usually on private account.
The  United Kindom s official liquid assets are of the order of f1 000 million
($2800 million). This is more than the UK' s current liabilities to the IMF ($1 700 mil-
lion) but is .only a fraction of the total liabilities represented by the sterling balances.
It should be. noted here that the Bank of England has again sought assistance from
the central banks of various countries. The figures have not been disdosed.
1 The United Kingdom has on several occasions had recourse to bilateral aid from various
central banks and to the IMF. The debts to the central banks were paid off early in 1967. Some
of the debts to the IMF have also been discharged. The latter were made up of tWo drawings
- .
one of $1000 million in December 1964, the other of $1400 million in May 1965. An
advance repayment of some $400 million on the first drawing was made in May 1967. The
balance of the first drawing is due to be repaid in December 1967. The amount to be settled
will depend on sterling drawings on the IMF by other borrowers in the meantime; at end-July
1967, the figure stood at $341 million. The second drawing is to be repaid by 1970.
2 The figures given above relate to monetary claims and liabilities only. Details of the UK'
long-term external assets and liabilities are now published regularly. , The September 1967 issue
of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin gives the latest figures (for end-1966):
(in  million)
Official
Private
Assets Liabilities Net position
5191 11 449 6258
28 488 12 334 + 16 114
Total 33 639 23 783 9856
B. These figures are official but are described in British sources as "precarious estimates
and/or known to be incomplete87. The maintenance of the nominal value of the sterling balances marks a consi-
derable reduction in their economic weight.
Towards the end of the 1940s the balanc:es represented 24% of th~ United Kingdom
, national product, but now only 12-13%; they were 40% higher than the United
Kingdom s annual exports twenty years ago; today they are a little below these
annual exports. In 1950/51 the value of liquid sterling claims held by foreigners
was about the same as the value of liquid dollar claims; in 1966, about one third of
such claims were held in sterling and two thirds in dollars. Various reasons suggest
that the changes in the international role of the pound will continue, but the main
question at present, in view of the possibility that the United Kingdom may join the
Community, is whether the pound may not in coming years be exposed, as in the past
dec:ade, to sharp fluctuations.
88. This possibility cannot be ruled out because the stability of the sterling balances
has hithertO depended mainly on a process of substitution of claims within the sterling
area. Certain Far Eastern and other countries have taken over from countries like
Egypt (which left the sterling area after the war), India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The
present distribution of sterling balances is such as might give rise to net  and
perhaps substantial  withdrawals in the future. In the last few years the African
countries have already been reducing their net sterling balances at a fairly high rate.
The balanc:e of non-sterling-area holders have sometimes fluctUated very widely.
This being so, it is not impossible that the sterling balances might  if the with-
drawals were stepped up  c:onstitute a factor of disequilibrium in the position of the
p~ited Kingdom and a sourc:e of difficulty for the Community if Britain were to
Jom.
89. The difficulties encountered by the British economy, both internally and exter-
nally, have led a number of observers  including British commentators themselves
to believe that even a modest 3 % annual growth rate between now and 1970 might
under certain circumstances prove beyond the potential of the British ec:onomy and
might lead to further payments difficulties.
In view of these considerations, it is dear that the accession of the United Kingdom
to the Community would raise economic and financial problems which will have to
be examined in depth.
Problems raised by United Kingdom membership
90. It will be appropriate to examine first of all the effects of accession on the
economy of the United Kingdom, as it could derive definite advantages from member-
ship.
They would consist in the first place in gains resulting from economic integration
with a neighbouring area whose long-term growth rate has been higher than that of
any other part of the world  except Japan. These gains will tend (particularly
See e,g. National Institute Economic Review (NIESR), February 1967 and later issues.
4,1this growth rate is maintained at a high average) to be much higher than the
ns the United Kingdom is likely to obtain if it seeks to retain its economic links
th more distant countries, especially those belonging to the Commonwealth prefer-
ce area. For this area includes countries whose staple products are raw materials
th low growth rateS and not much likelihood of becoming really profitable markets
the . foreseeable future. Moreover, some other countries in this area  such as
Istralia and Canada  are countries whose inter.national economic links are coming
)re and more to depend on regional considerations rather than on the need to
lintain their traditional economic ties with Britain.
. The benefits that the United Kingdom can expect to draw from membership of
e Community are not confined to those due to the wider markets it would gain in the
)mmunity..
odernization of the economy should be greatly facilitated. Joining the Community
Duld give the United Kingdom the stimulus it needs to push through vital structural
forms and provide the economic environment most conducive to their succ:ess. 
Duld give the British Gover.nment the opportunity to shape its development policy
)t only with reference to considerations of domestic equilibrium but also in the
mtext of a vast, single market, just as the six ,present members of the Community
d in 1957.
llblic opinion and the authorities in Britain are bec:oming increasingly aware of the
lcious circle in which the economy seems to be caught. The adaptability of British
llsinessmen, who for the most part are in favour of joining the Common Market
. an essential factor here.
2. While there can be no doubt about the economic and psychological advantages
1at would derive from the changes brought about by membership of the Community,
: must be rec:ognized that they will not immediately be felt in full.  In  this
onnection it must be stressed that the fillip  the stimulus which, it is argued
rill be provided by membership of the Community  will not be as beneficial as it
ould be unless the United Kingdom takes in good time the steps which will make
t possible for stability to be restored and maintained.
)3. These steps will be even more necessary in view of the fact that membership
)f the Community would at first impose additional burdel1s on Britain. These
nclude:
~) Those that will affect prices and costs in the United Kingdom and its balance
)f payments because of the changes in the sources and conditions of supply necessi-
,ated by adoption of the c:ommon agricultural policy and' the unavoidable chal1ges in
trade relations with Commonwealth and other countries;
b)  Those that would stem from suc:h liberalization of servic:es and capital as would
bring Britain into line with the average level of liberalization already achieved in the
Common Market countries;
c)  Those that would be raised by opening the British market to much keener
competition from foreign manufactures.
94. In view of the time-lag that might occur in certain cases or in c:ertain fields
of integration between the economic advantages that the United Kingdom woulddraw from joining the Common Market and the disadvantages that would be entailed
for that country s competitive position as it is today, adaptation by this country would
be required. 
How long this took would depend chiefly on what measures the British Government
adopted and how effective they were; sufficiently detailed information about the
restoration of lasting economic equilibrium in the United Kingdom must be available
in order to decide during the negotiations just what should be done in the transitional
period. This basic problem should therefore be examined at the outset of the negotiations. 
95. While it would be for the British Government to decide what measures of
adaptation were needed, it is nevertheless essential that the parties conc:erned should
consult together on the question of timing and the scale of the action to be
undertaken. It should be pointed out that the British authorities, in their efforts
to prepare the economy for integration, might unilaterally adopt certain measures which
could have major repercussions for the Community. It is therefore important that
these measures should be concerted before they are put into effect. 
96. Action on these lines would also serve the useful purpose of making clear the
interpretation that the Community has gradually worked Out for certain clauses in the
Treaty (Articles 2 and 104 in particular) which deal with the objectives of ec:onomic
policy. For in this field, where the relevant texts do no more than give a broad
outline, it would not be enough if the countries applying for membership merely
stated their agreement with general objectives: they should also accept the priorities
that advancing Community co-ordination has made it possible to establish both intern~
ally and at international level.
97. There is one field where this point is of exceptional importance  mon~tary
matters. For this is where the process IOf adjustment required of the British ec:onomy
would be most necessary and most difficult, and where the present members of the
Community would be exposed to the greatest risks. Evidently, the sc:ale of this
adjustment, which the British authorities will have to make whatever happens, could
depend to a great extent on action involving all those affected by the extension of
the Community.
, 98. ' The statements made so far by the British Government indicate that it would
not be disposed to take the initiative in bringing up the sterling problem in the
proposed negotiations with the Community. Nevertheless, it has declared that it 
prepared to abstain from invoking Article 108 of the Treaty in the event of diffi-
culties arising from factors bound up with the international role of sterling. In
general, it would seem that the British Government prefers to seek a solution to the
problem of sterling as an international currency in a framework wider than that
offered by the Community.
A mere undertaking not to invoke Article 108 does not settle the matter as far as the
Community is concerned. For lack of adequate elucidation it is not at present
possible to assess the exact scope of such an undertaking. It should, however, be
recalled that Article 108 deals not only with the possibility of mutual assistance in
the financial field but also with a range of procedures and instruments that might if
necessary be employed to forestall what would be the most serious danger to which a
developing economic union c:ould be exposed  the isolation of one of the national
economies involved because of balance-of-payments difficulties. Whatever the originof the difficulties, the damage that might he done to the Community is such that it
could not forgo the means of action provided by the Treaty.
The present prospects for an overall solution to the problems raised by the functioning
of the reserve-currencies system do not seem to be such that they will encourage
the present members of the Community to ac:cept the British preferences on this
point.
99. Moreover, the arrangements now in forc:e between certain central banks and the
Bank of England, providing for certain measures of co-operation in the event of
withdrawal under specified conditions of part of the sterling balances, do not seem
to offer an alternative to Community action because the sums covered by the arrange-
ments are too small and bec:ause the assistance involved may not be available for
long enough. Although in present circumstances such arrangements make a useful
contribution to reducing the possible threats to sterling, they do not seem to constitUte
a solid enough base upon which to build up the monetary relations that seem to be
required by an enlarged Community in which one of the members had a c:urrency
with the present characteristics of the pound sterling and a financial centre such as
London.
100. All this points to the need for action of a wider scope, but it would not be
possible to settle the details unless there were consultation between all the interested
parties, who would have to establish very close c:o-operation.
From the Community s point of view, ac:tion of this kind should not be designed
simply, to settle the sitUation arising from the comple:x: of claims and liabilities
constituted in the past between the United Kingdom and countries of the sterling
area. Financial traditions, the ties of various kinds that would continue to exist
between the United Kingdom and certain other countries, the characteristics of the
London market  these are all factors tending to give London a privileged role.
Although an enlarged Community could as a unit benefit considerably from the
technical machinery which is more sophisticated in London than anywhere else in
Europe, it is evident that extension of the Community could have implications that
go far beyond mere questions of financial technique and the practical ability of the
City to fulfil the role of major intermediary in banking services.
If the role of the pound as a trading currency cannot be challenged, it is none the
less hard to  see  how this currency could continue after Britain joined the Community
to occupy a position in the international monetary system different from that of the
currencies of the other member countries.
Furthermore, management by the United Kingdom of a reserve currency would
require an economic and financial policy geared at one and the same time to the
Community s own objec:tives and to others extraneous to the Community. 
Finally, no national currency could possibly assume the role of a Community mone-
tary system, which would have to result from gradual co-ordination of Member States
policies and strengthening of the common economic, monetary and financial policies.
101. The disequilibria affecting the United Kingdom s economy are such as to put
serious difficulties in the way of fulfilment of the normal obligations that would be
entailed by joining the Community and complying 'with the Treaties and the decisions
subsequently taken in execution of the Treaties. Examination of these difficulties
tOgether with the United Kingdom Government would provide an opportunity for
seeking ways and means of overcoming them.In any case adaptation appears to be necessary. It would be difficult to settle the
arrangements for the transitional period unless there were a dear enough picture
of how lasting equilibrium was to be restored in the British economy.
It is for the British authorities to decide on the steps they have to take. From the
beginning of the negotiations, however, there should be close consultation between
all the parties concerned because certain of the steps taken might have major and
immediate repercussions on t~e present Member States and on the Community as
a whole.
Finally, if the extension of the Community is to have the best chances of success, an
endeavour should be made to establish dose! co-ordination among the members of
the Community of their economic, monetary and fiQancial policies.Chapter 
Other problems relating to economic union
102. The problems to which the extension of the Community gives rise in .connection
with the Treaties concern either the risk of distortion of competition resulting from
the special situation of the new members or the need to ensure a satisfac:tory organiza-
tion of the Community s new economic area.
The importance for the development of the Community, at the present stage, of the
completion of the economic: union must be stressed. The following points should
be mentioned:
a)  Free movement of capital
103. Establishment of an economic union calls for the gradual introduction of arran-
gements under which capital has a high degree of freedom to move betWeen the
countries in the union.
Under the tWO direc:tives adopted by the Council to implement Artic:le 67 of the
Treaty, various types of capital movement are entirely exempt from exc:hangecontrol
especially those relating to direct investments, transactions in securities which are
quoted on stOck exchanges, export c:redits, real estate transactions and "personal"
transfers.
In conformity with the principle stated in Section 9, second paragraph, and Section 10
of the present document, accession to the Community entails acceptance by the new
members not only of the articles of the Treaty regarding capital movements but
also of the direc:tives adopted to implement those articles. In particular, since the end
of the war, the United Kingdom has maintained permanent restrictions on capital
movements with countries outside the sterling area.
During the last series of crises, from October 1964 onwards, these restrictions were
tightened up. The British authorities have also instituted new arrangements to
restrict freedom of capital movements vis-a.-vis sterling-area countries as well.
The implementation of the commitments stemming from the Treaty and from Council
directives would require the new members to change their present regulations. For
the United Kingdom, this question should be considered as part of the general study
of the ec:onomic, financial and monetary situation of this country.
b)  Fiscal harmonization
104. The establishment of a common market comparable to a domestic market calls
for a great amount of fiscal harmonization. The new members would not merely
have to acc:ept the directives on turnover tax already adopted but also current commit-
ments to new directives in this field. It would have to be ascertained during
the negotiations whether the new members were prepared to join the present mem-
bers in their efforts to achieve harmonization in other fiscal fields, such as excise
duties and the tax systems applicable to capital movements, industrial combination or
company profits, with a view to enabling tax frontiers and frontier controls to be
eliminated.c)  Res t r i c t i ve a g r e e men t s an d d 0 m i n ant p 0 sit ion 5
105. Any extension of the Common Market may have the advantage that a greater
degree of concentration would still be compatible with maintenance of effective
competition. From this angle the accession. of Great Britain and the other three
countries would make it easier to define and implement a competition polic:y compa~
tible with the development of large-scale enterprises.
As the new members have no difficulty in accepting the aims and procedures of
Community policy in this sphere, the only problems which arise are those concerning
transition (for example, time-limits for notifying restrictive agreements).
d)  Pat e n t 
106. British membership would probably help towards adoption of the draft conven-
tion for a European patent law. The current discussions on this matter in the
Council have been held up by political difficulties.
e)  Technical obstac:les to trade: industrial standards
107. Owing to the divergences between British standards or those of certain other
candidates and the standards at present in force in the Member States, one effec:t of
the extension of the Community would be an appreciable inc:rease in the extent to
which technical obstacles hamper intra-Community trade. In view, however, of the
interest shown by the United Kingdom in this field, it may be c:onsidered that an
extension , of the market will encourage all concerned to find ways of overcoming the
present difficulties.
Moreover, the British should not lose sight of the advantages of adopting the decimal
system in the United Kingdom.
f)  Companies
108. Work on the co-ordination of company law would be further complic:ated if
the United Kingdom joined. The British system of company law is based on a
concept of the company which is not familiar on the Continent. The types of
company do not correspond to those on the Continent, c:apital has not the same
guarantee function, and the system of boards and general meetings contains peculia-
rities which it would be very difficult to iron out.
On the other hand, the obvious economic advantage of setting up a European com-
pany in the enlarged Community justifies the hope that English law will not represent
a further obstacle, since ~he Government of the United Kingdom has already declared
its readiness to modify its legislation to this end.
1 "Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European
Communities" (Cmnd. 3301), ~ 36
, "
Considerable amendment of our national law might
eventually be involved...g) 
I n v  est  me n t by non - m e m b e r c 0 u n t r i e s
109. In view of long-established links between the United States and the United
Kingdom, a substantial proportion of Amerkan investment goes to the latter country.
The position of Great Britain would doubtless be strengthened by membership of
the Community.
There would therefore be a particularly strong case for co-ordinating the attitudes of
the Member States in an enlarged Community. This problem should be examined
during the negotiations.
h)  Regional policy
110. Regional problems are very important in two of the countries applying for
membership: Norway and the United Kingdom.
In Norway the problem is that of the gap between incomes in the more developed
regions and those in the outlying regions, particularly northern Norway; spedal measures
have been taken to aid agriculture in these outlying regions.
In certain areas of the United Kingdom, espedally in the south around London
there is excessive c:oncentration, while other .areas are insuffidently developed or .are
suffering from the decline of their long-established industries. However, the United
Kingdom has long experience of regional policy; it uses certain techniques whkh
could be considered for adoption by the Community (restrktions on investment in
overdeveloped regions, construction of industrial buildings by the public authorities
adaptation of short-term economic polic:y to regional needs).
If the Community were enlarged, it might be feared that the difficulties of the
peripheral reg10ns would inc:rease, espedally in Great Britain. It does not, however
seem that in an enlarged Community the problem would be any other than in the
Community of the Six.
The Commission stresses the need to arrive at a Community concept of regional
policy (including investment incentives for investOrs from non-member countries as
well). The sole effect of extension would be to add to the need for a Community
approach to regional policy: it would not entail arrangements differing from those
already required in the Six.
111. Ireland has embarked upon a policy of encouraging industrialization. The
object of this policy is to promote the eoonomk development of the country as a
whole rather than redress the differences in ec:onomk development between the various
regions. Gross national product per head is approximately the same in Ireland as 
Italy, but differences between regions are not so great as in the latter country.
i)  Financing of social sec:urIty
112. In the United Kingdom about one half of sodal security expenditure is financed
by the public authorities, and flat rate contributions make up the other half. In the
Six at least three quarters is financed out of wage-related c:ontributions from workersand employers, the balance being found by the authorities. The British system might favour British firms, espec:ially in those industries where wages represent a large share of added value, if this advantage is not offset by higher taxation.
However, this conclusion follows from a theoretical approach. If the conditions were in fact such that specific distortions could ensue, it would still have to be shown
industry by industry, that the distortions were such that they must be eliminated (Art. 101 of the EEC Treaty). 
The same problem will also have to be examined in the case of the Scandinavian
countries.
j) 
Nor d i c I a b 0 u r mar k e t
113. The existence of a single labour market among the Scandinavian countries will make it nec:essary to check how far Community priority in access to employment
would be affected - by the  de jure  and  de facto  situation in Scandinavia. Difficulties
could arise if, for instanc:e, one or other of the Nordic countries remained outside the
enlarged Community or if no special agreements on the point were made with those Scandinavian countries which did not become members.
k)  Com mo n w e a I t h Im m i g ran t s Ac t
114. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act governs access to employment .and estab- lishment in the United Kingdom for citizens of the Commonwealth countries. It is based on the principle of United Kingdom law whereby citizens both of the United Kingdom and Colonies and of Commonwealth countries rank as British subjec:ts. One
application of this principle is the possibility for Commonwealth citizens to acq'l;lire
United Kingdom citizenship after five years' residence.
According to Mr Wilson s statement in the Commons on 8 May 1967, the British
Government c:onsiders that, exc:ept as otherwise provided  in association agreements
for instance  the facilities granted Commonwealth immigrants in the United King- dom after accession should not necessarily give them rights to enter the labour markets
of other countries in the wider Community. On the other hand the British Govern- ment does recognize that a problem exists regarding priority in access to employment.
l)  T ran s port
115. Extension should not cause any difficulties beyond those already encountered
by the Six in building up a common policy for road, rail and inland waterway
transport. It would, however, create a new situation for sea and air transport, in view of the part played by these modes of transport not only in trade with non- member countries but also in the internal trade of the enlarged Community. The possibility of Community action in these fields is provided for in the Treaty of Rome
and it would be useful if during the negotiations this point too could be examined.
See sec. 122 in the Chapter on ECSC problems.m)  Ene t gy 
116. A stUdy .of the implications of a wider Community for energy policy must be
prefaced by a brief reminder of where the Communities stand with regard to working
out a common policy in this Held.
After postponing the formulation of an overall energy policy, the Council adopted on
21 April 1964 a protocol fixing the objectives to be attained, i.e. assured and cheap
supplies and the avoidance of abrupt shifts from one form of power to another
without depriving the consumer of his right of free choice. At the same time the
Governments put off the task of. elaborating a common energy policy until .after the
merger of the institutions.
This protocol has not prevented Member States from pursuing national energy policies
particularly because of the economic and social problems created by the decline in
outlets for coal, a development which has very different implications from one
member country to another.
The multiplicity of national measures has led to distortions which have affected the
competitiveness of the Member States' economies.
The availability of energy in the several Member States vades so muc:h that, it is the
principal stumbling-block in reaching a c:ommon policy; this sitUation would not be
substantially modified by the accession of one c:ountry which is a large coal producer
and of three others whose national resourc:es are small (except for Norway s water
power).
117. As regards coal, all the countries applying for membership should participate
to the same extent as the present members in any actions and arrangements jointly
decided on or planned for the purpose of resolving the (oal problem (see ECSC
Chapter).
As regards nuclear energy, the accession of Great Britain, a c:ountry where greater
advances have been made in substitUting this source of energy for the traditional ones
would doubtless make it even more imperative to work out a c:ommon energy policy
and to co-ordinate reactor development programmes (see Euratom Chapter).
The natUre of the difficult problems with which the Six have to grapple in the
petroleum and natural gas sector is hardly to be modified by the accession of
new members. The problems would however, become greater, and the need to solve
them correspondingly more pressing.
Free movement of refined petroleum products between Great Britain and the Com-
munity countries would stimulate trade between the tWO areas, but probably only to
a small extent since integration of the market at company level is already largely an
accomplished fact.
Implications for the ECSC and Euratom are dealt with in special Chapters.Chapter 
Proble11ls peculiar to ECSC
a)  The co a I and s tee I in d u s tr i e s
applying for membership
four countries the
118. From the angle of the Treaty of Paris, the general characteristics of the countries
applying for membership of the European Coal and Steel Community are the following:
(in '000 t)
United 
Kingdom
(1966)
Norway
(1965)
ECSC
(1965)
Denmark 
(196~)
Ireland
(1965)
Coal and coke
Production (coal only)
Imports
of which from ECSC
Exports
of which to ECSC
177 400 434
1 047
176
3 079 237
2 033 148
15 962 526
391
138
24 705 686
1 789
816 772
350 436
2 967 305
289
13 877 2 747
16 217
1 386
700
Pig iron
Production of pig iron
Imports
of which from ECSC
Exports
of which to ECSC
Steel
Produ~tion of crude steel
of which special steels
Imports
of which from ECSC
Exports
of which to ECSC
Iron and manganese ore
Production
Imports
of which from ECSC
Exports
of which to ECSC
4 324
509
204 272
24 610
186
4 701
61 083
897
267
4041 85 118
6 771
2 294 8861
5371
1392
322
190
12 383
73 030
52 538
363
1 1966.
2 1964.
These figures show that most of the problems relate to the United Kingdom; some of
the observations made are also valid for the other candidates.119. The United Kingdoms membership would mean the advent, in an enlarged
Coal and Steel Community, of two major industries, for British coal output is as high
as that of the present Community, and its iron and steel output is just under one
third of the Community s. The fundamental issue arising from the applications for
membership is therefore whether and on what conditions these industries can be
integrated in the system set up under the Treaty of Paris. 
Acceptance of the Treaty of Paris
120. Statements made by the United Kingdom Government show that it is ready to
accept the Treaty and all the rules adopted so far to ensure its implementation. On this
point it must be made clear that acceptance of the Treaty means not only the Treaty
document itself and its annexes in their present form, but also measures taken in
pursuance of the Treaty by the Community institutions, a number of agreements
between the Governments of the Member States which relate to the implementation
of the Treaty, and also a number of agreements concluded with non-member countries.
Furthermore, experienc:e shows that the specific provisions of the Treaty do not c:over
all situations produced by changes in the structure of the industries governed by the
Treaty of Paris, in particular the coal industry. Through application of Article 95,
covering situations not provided for in the Treaty, the Community s operating rules
have already evolved considerably (e.g. the system of aids for collieries). This evolu-
tion will c:ertainly continue. The countries seeking membership would have to accept
the principle of this dynamic process, which will lead to means of action supplement-
ing those specifically provided by the Treaty. 
c)  Special problems of adaptation
121. As regards both steel and coal, acceptance of the price rules (Art. 60 and
implementing provisions) will mean a change in the British systems (delivered and
area prices). Details of such changes should be worked out during the negotiations.
122. In transport, the Treaty rules aim mainly at non-distrimination, sufficient infor-
mation on transport charges for implementation of Article 60 (price lists, price calcula-
tion and alignment), establishment of international through rates and harmonization
of transport conditions. Here again, the way the rules will have to be applied by
the United Kingdom will need to be spelled out, on account chiefly of the present
organization of transport in that country.
Furthermore, the existence of a sea passage affecting all transactions betweeen the
United Kingdom and the Community as it is today adds a new dimension to the
present difficulties of appying the rules on transport and on the price of the products
concerned.
Particular attention must therefore be paid to information on and publication of sea
freight rates, and this involves serious technical difficulties.
d)  How the common market would work
Community an enlarged
123. If the United Kingdom s coal and steel industries are integrated in the common
market, the effects on its working will be considerable and will be marked by the
following characteristics.The 1946 law nationalizing the coal industry places central responsibility for all
production and sales in the hands of the National Coal Board (NCB), which is subject
to the authority of the Minister of Power.
The arrangements for implementing the 1967 law nationalizing the iron and steel
industry will place full responsibility for the industry in the hands of the British
Steel Corporation (BSC), whic:h will also come under the Minister of Power. Only a .
small percentage of the steel industry will remain private.
Ownership arrangements in these industries would not be affected (Art. 83 of the
ECSC Treaty). However, the economic importance of the iron and steel industry
and of coalmining in Great Britain compared with the scale of the corresponding
industries in the European Coal and Steel Community, their internal struc:tures and
especially the responsibilities entrusted to the NCB for supply could well engender
problems of balance in the field of competition.
124. It must furthermore be noted that during the last few years the situation of the
Community s coal industry has depended more and more on the concerted action
of the national and Community authorities intended, in particular, to safeguard conti-
nuity of employment and avoid disturbances in the Member States' economies.
Account must he taken, however, in view of the economic situation of the coal
mjning industry both in the Community and in the United Kingdom, of having in the
common energy market two coal industries which are of the same size and both have
surplus output.
125. Independently of the specific problems that may be caused by the size, internal
structure and working of public enterprises in' the United Kingdom, it must 
recalled that Article 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty contains provisions which make it
possible to ensure that the dominant position of public or private enterprises in the
common market is not used for purposes which conflict with those of the Treaty.
126. Accordingly a set of transitional measures would be needed, making it possible
to ensure that the process of integrating the two markets takes place progressively
and smoothly. Consequently it does not seem that the British wish for a shortened
transitional period for coal and steel should be granted.
127. Where the membership of Norway, Denmark and Ireland is concerned, there
would be virtually no problems from the Community angle if these countries were
prepared to accept the ECSC Treaty, any implementing regulations, etc., in force and
the principles already accepted for its further development. As in the case of the
United Kingdom, the solution of certain problems, such as transport by sea or the
possible effects of Decision No. 1 / 67 on the marketing of .coke, would have to be
found at technical level.
128. Once these countries were members, the Community s not inc:onsiderable exports
of steel to them would benefit from the advantages already by the United Kingdom
as their partner in EFTA, but the tariff preference is so slight that its removal will
probably change the competitive situation but little. 
129. To sum up, the problems that arise in the ECSC sphere concern mainly the
establishment of arrangements under which a few very large undertakings could be
integrated into the common market in an orderly fashion.Chapter 
Specific problems of the European AtOmic Energy Community
A. United Kingdom
I. British nuclear potential
130. Since the sec.ond world war the United Kingdom s drive to develop its nuclear
potential has been sustained and vigorous.
The country s basic facilities  one isotope separation plant, eight plutonium pro-
duction reactors, four prototype reactors, three marine propulsion reactors, 23 research
reactors, an installed capacity of 4000 MW at the end of 1966 (as against 2 000 in
the Community) and its fuel element reprocessing plants  give it a power which is
still as great as that of the whole European Community.
This is supplementary by facilities for obtaining uranium, in the shape of supply
contracts and financia.1 partnerships linking it with. the United States, Canada, South
Africa and Australia.
The United Kingdom also has at its disposal a real surplus of nuclear scientists and
engineers, especially since the staff cutbacks carried out by the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Authority (33000 employees in 1966, compared with 40000 in 1961).
But for a long time past British scientists and engineers have been playing 
leading role in the atomic development of various other c:ountries.
II. The pro b I ems
131. Uncertainty regarding certain fields of Euratom activity, such as
the third research programme, makes it impossible at present to get
pictUre of what the Community negotiating posidon would be.
However, certain questions present themselves in any case:
supply and
a complete
The British contribution in the field of nuclear research and know-how
132. It should be pointed out first of all that the Euratom Treaty contains no
clause binding any member country to place its knowledge at the disposal of the
others. The United Kingdom could therefore in theory sign the Treaty as it stood
and give no information whatever to its new partners. However, a problem arises
here which was already touched upon at the previous negotiations: .on joining the
EAEC, the United Kingdom would have access not only to the Community s installa-
tions and know-how but also to those of the individual member countries, made
available to the Community as a result of contracts of participation and association (the
national share in which is over 60%). So it would be no more than fair if the
new member were to make a contribution the natUre of which, as well as the way
in whkh it should be made, could be negotiated, and which would represent what was
called in the previous talks the United Kingdom s "entratlce fee" to a Community
with something .of its own to offer.133. United Kingdom participation in the Community s future research and deve~
lopment programme (after 31 December 1967, when the present programme ends)
obviously depends on the general nature of that programme.
If the negotiations for joining Euratom coincide with formulation of the programme
it is to be expected that the United Kingdom would want to playa fitting part in
determining the .future of Euratom.
One of the aims of this future programme will be to determine whether the Community
is to c:ontinue to participate in Dragon, an international project based in Britain which
constitutes an example of succ:essful technical co-operation between the Community,
Great Britain and the other countries of the European Nuclear Energy Agency.
134. Moreover, if the United Kingdom intends to offset the exceptions or adjust-
ments it is asking for in certain sec:tors of the overall negotiations by its lead in
some other growth industry, notably the nuclear field, this contribution should be given
concrete form through special arrangements in specific domains.
Industrial structure
135. The fact that produc:tion of electricity has been nationalized in Britain could
of course give rise to certain internal market problems. But these problems are no
different from those already encountered in the Community, since electricity is also
nationalized in France and Italy.
Note should, however, be taken of the special part played by the United Kingdom
AtOmic Energy Authority in industry. Its prices for all the elements of the fuel
cycle (natural uranium, fuel elements, reprocessing) are such that one may legitimately
ask whether they are not subsidized; if so, this might raise problems in the sphere of
competition.
External relations
136. During the 1962/63 negotiations the British delegation put before the Com-
munity a list of 22 agreements regarding which it ,recommended application of the
principle embodied in Article 105 of the Euratom Treaty, that prior agreements may
be invoked as grounds for a derogation.
Some of these agreements have since expired, and others have been added to the list.
Before a decision is taken it would be advisable to examine, tOgether with the British
delegation, the importance and duration of the derogations from the Treaty resulting
from recognition of the fact that these agreements may be invoked as grounds for a
derogation.
d)  Supplies
137. Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty, which deals with supplies, must under
Article 76 of that Treaty be either confirmed or revised. This would appear to be
necessary before such matters are broached in negotiations with the British, who have
substantial assets in this field:
i) Financial interests in development of the uranium industry in Canada, South
Africa and Australia;ii) Long-term supply contracts with the USA and Canada (these agreements do not
always make a clear distinction between military and dvil applications);
Hi) Isotope separation plant at Capenhurst.
Safeguards and controls
138. During the previous , negotiations, in 1962, there were discussions on the inter-
pretation of the Treaty Article regarding the application of Euratom safeguards and
controls to the British installations connected with the military programme. There is an
arrangement between the Community and the Frenc:h Government on this head
whkh might constitute a useful precedent.
139. Acceptance by the British Government of IAEA safeguards and controls with
regard to certain British installations or imports raises difficulties similar to those met
during the current negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty. These difficulties do
not seem to be insurmountable.
B. Other countries
140.  Norway  has a limited nuclear potential comprising, in particular, a reactor
(Halden), operation of which is being shared by certain Community countries. Norway
is likewise linked to the IAEA by various agreements, and the agreement between
Norway and the USA has been transferred to the IAEA for the implementation of
safeguards and controls.
141.  Denmark  has a celebrated institute of theoretical physics and a small atomic
centre at Rise: The agreement between Deflmark and the United Kingdom has also
been transferred to the IAEA for the implementation of safeguards and controls.
142.  Ireland  has no nuclear programme.
143. This summary examination of the problems arising from enlargement of the
European Atomic Energy Community prompts the following conclusions:
i) Britain would contribute an atomic potential (scientific and industrial) as large
as the rest of the Community put together;
and
ii) If this contribution is to improve the Community s ability to compete with
non-member countries, the Member States of the enlarged Community would have
to exchange sdentific information, pool their efforts, and pursue a coherent common
policy in this field.Chapter 7
Technological and scientific aspects
144. The stUdy of the problem raised in the technological and scientific fields by
the Britishl application for membership of the Community is inevitably dominated
by three essential factors:
i) The Community has not yet worked out the basis for a common technological
development policy. In October the Council will for the first time, on the basis of
a report by experts of the Member States and the Commission, be dealing with the
problems which fac:e the Community in the scientific and technological fields.
ii) The main featUre of the technological development of Europe is the growing
importance of the instances of co-operation and of the bilateral or multilateral projects
in which the Member States often. work side by side with the United Kingdom
(space researc:h, aeronautic:s).
iii) The British Government is particu~arly interested in the progress of European
integration in this field, not only through bilateral or multilateral co-operation in the
sectors where governments have special means of action at their disposal but evefi
more through the c:reation of the bask conditions that will enable enterprises to
step up their efforts; the British Government has put forward this point of view
in a whole series of statements, going as far as to contemplate the establishment
of a European technological Community which, according to the interpretation put
on it by its British advocates, should not be c:onsidered as being distinct from the
three Communities which are now being merged and which the United Kingdom
wants to join.
145. The present chapter deals with:
i) The prospects opened up by British membership
ii) The problems which this would raise for a policy
in the Community.
of technological development
I. The prospects
munity
146. These prospects must be assessed not just from the angle of the physical
contribution in terms of human and financial resources whkh the United Kingdom
might make to the tOtal resources of the Community, but primarily from the point
of view of how far the wider membership would improve the outlook. for co-ordinated
action in the Community. In view of the widespread duplication of effort in the
activities undertaken in the different European countries, it is pointless merely to
aggregate national expenditure or resources.
opened extension 0 f th e Com-
The scientific and technical potential in the United Kingdom and the Community
147. For roughly twenty years the United Kingdom has been engaged in develop-
ment work of an importance such that its overall potential is today unequalled in
Western Europe.
This chapter does not deal with Denmark, Ireland or Norway.This potential can be summed up in a few figures:
Research and development budgets 1963 (OECD figures,1 in $ million)
United Kingdom:  2160  EEC:  3440
of which:
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
1299
1436
238
330
137
Staff employed in 1963 (scientists in terms of full-time employment)
United Kingdom: 59 400 EEC: 100 000
of which:
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
32 500
33 000
19 400
9200
5500
In 1963 the United Kingdom thus spent what corresponds to 63% of the total
expenditUre of the Community countries while in the same year the, number of
scientists it employed was 59% of the number employed in the whole of the
Community.
If the enlarged Community is taken as a basis, the potentials would therefore rank
as follows (on the basis of statistics on expenditUre):
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Netherlands
Italy
Belgium
in%
5.4
2.4
Enlarged Community:
148. However, it is not on the basis of these overall figures alone that the scientific
and technological contribution which the United Kingdom might make to the Com-
munity can be assessed. Large numbers of scientists and a high level of expenditUre
do not necessarily guarantee quality, originality or efficiency.
1 The statistics shown are taken from the latest documents, published by OECD in January 1967,
which include the results of the International Statistical Year on Research and Development.
More recent data which are also comparable are not available.
France 1964: $1650 million.
The estimate of expenditure for 1963 seems to be too low.It has often been stressed by expertsl that reservations of this kind are particularly
applicable in the United Kingdom and that, for instanc:e,
i) The United Kingdom has on several occasions during the last 15 years under-
taken some very costly, but unprofitable, if not actually fruitless projec:ts (e.g. Comet
Blue Streak ...
ii) The programme pursued by the technical Ministries (Ministry of Technology,
Ministry of Aviation, General Post Office) have suffered  fmm  certain lac:k of
co-ordination;
iii)  In  many sectors British industry seems to have sacrific:ed long-term considerations
to short-term benefits, their research teams concentrating on conversion programmes
rather than innovation (electrkal engineering, telecommunic:ations ...
iv) The "brain drain" has affec:ted the United Kingdom more than most other
countries.
149. Without prejudice to the analysis in depth whkh these remarks will inevitably
call for, particularly with regard to their implications for the United Kingdom
technologic:al potential, it is true that in several spheres this has assumed dimensions
and reached a level whic:h give it pride of place on the international level.
With regard to basic research, mention must be made of
i) Theoretical physics, nuclear physics and solid state physics
ii) Chemistry
iii) Biology (and more particularly molecular biology)
In  the technological field
i) Ae~onautics and engines
ii) Electronics and computers (For the most part, these firms are less
on  US  industries than continental firms are)
iii) Atomic energy - (14% of Britain s electric power is of nuclear origin)
iv) Chemistry.
dependent
The implications of British membership
150. Unquestionably, pooling the resources of the Community and United Kingdom
would give the Six a more solid basis on which to map out a technological develop-
ment policy.
This point should not, however, be overestin;:tated. A comparison between the
human and financial reSources mobilized for research and development purposes in
the United States gives some idea of the relative importance of the Community
even if it is enlarged.
EEC  UK:
Research expenditurl3  1963  (in  million)
5 600  USA:  21  075
Particularly as a result of the survey of BritaiJ1 s scieJ1tific policy carried out by the OECD
Committee for ScieJ1ce Policy (March 1966).This means that, at current exchange rates, the United States was in 1963 spending
six times as muc:h as the countries of the present Community and almost four times
as much as the countries of the enlarged Community. It must also be borne in
mind, when considering these figures, that there is far more duplication in the
scientific and technical programmes of the seven European countries than in the
United States.
EEC + UK
USA
Scientific and technical staff  1963
159 400 trained scientists
496500 trained scientists
In the matter of trained scientists, then, the ratio between the United States and the
enlarged Community is 3.1:1.
A quick glanc:e at the overall statistics on research and development shows, furthermore
that in the US the ratio between expenditure authorized for development and that
earmarked for applied research is 3: 1 whereas the corresponding ratio for the enlarged
Community is only 2:1.
Similarly, if research and development expenditure by the enlarged Community in
various branches of industry is compared with that of the United States (shown in
each case as 1 000), the following picture emerges:
Electrical
Aeronautics engineering Chemicals Manufacturing
(inc!. industries
electronics)
000 000 000 000
103 112
175
Country
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
Source:  Statistical Year, OECD - More recent statistics, which are incomplete or not really comparable, do not allow of
strict international comparisons. However, the most recent general data available indicate that the gap between the
human and linancial resources employed in research in the United States and in the European COuntries has widened
slightly.
As an illustration of this, it can be recalled that five private American firms spend as
much on research each year as the seven countries put' together and that one American
company specializing in space electronics spends three times the combined space
research budgets of these countries.
151. These statistics for research expenditure demonstrate that the effort of the
Six plus the United Kingdom is still far below that of the United States. It should
also be mentioned that aggregating expenditure by the Six and by the United Kingdom
tends to overstate the real value of the Community effort, because of the many
duplications of national programmes.Nevertheless, the United Kingdoms accession would have the advantage of making it
easier to establish strong points and pioneering units. In some key industries, indeed
(electronics, for instance), the most advanced British firms often appear to be more
independent of American industry than similar Continental firms. Moreover, since
they are well off from the angle of organization, size and management (modern
management and forecasting techniques are often more widely applied than on the
Continent ) to meet the need for continuous innovation, these firms could appreciably
bolster the Communitys ability to compete.
152. Furthermore, in terms of co-operation proper, the British contribution often
appears necessary to bring to a successful conclusion ambitious scientific and techno-
logical programmes in Europe, such as in molecular biology, solid state physics
electronics, aeronautics and space technology.
It would provide a better foundation for existing agreements or ties betWeen Com-
munity States, for the United Kingdom is already associated with the Community
countries in various joint programmes and agreements, such as the multilateral inter-
governmental agreements whic:h led to the creation of ESRO ELDO and CERN,
bilateral agreements with France, Germany and the Netherlands in aeronautics
multilateral inter-industry agreements made in reply to calls for bids by European
technological organizations, and bilateral inter-industry agreements.
153. The prospects opened up by this theoretical regrouping of forces, however
are not yet fact. Whether enlarged or not, the Community will not be able to
benefit from them unless it can be assured of agreement on objectives and a deter-
mination to develop jointly. The conditions under which this could occur have
only just been studied 2 and no policy has been adopted on them as yet; the conditions
include gradual reduction of the duplication of effort and the overlapping of
programmes, the training and retraining of staff in the light of the needs and
objectives of, the Community (and this means that the Community must  have  objec-
tives), the gradual dovetailing of programmes by mapping out and fol1owing up
the lines on which the various national centres are to specialize (i.e. that the direc-
tions to be taken by the national centres with regard to specialization be mapped
out and followed), association of the industries of member countries in the task 
drawing up and carrying out national and Community technological programmes
and so on. 
154. The accession of the United Kingdom would alter neither the nature of this
problem nor, apparently, the difficulties in the way of its solution. Even if it added
to their complexity by the mere fact of increasing the number of members, it might
reduce the difficulties because the will and capacity for independent European action
appear to be at least as strong, where science and technology are concerned, in the
United Kingdom as in the Community c:ountries.
On the other hand, if the problem c:ould in fact be solved by merging national
fields of technology and implementing joint projects and programmes, the accession
of the United Kingdom would considerably alter the Community s sc:ope for action
for the enlarged Community, by virtue of its very size, would constitute a better
basis for the implementation of its own research and development policy on .
international scale.
Though this is true only of the most advanced firms.
In the Medium-term Economic Policy Committee.
The idea of a "technological Community" has not been drafted in any great detail by the British
authorities.II. The problems that entry would raise
155. The problems that UK entry would- raise in science and technology should be
examined in conjunction with Community work planned. This work should decide
among other points, how far action can be undertaken at Community level:
i) For the rapid achievement of economic union in fields of c:oncern to research
and innovation (European patent, European type of company, harmonization of
taxation, technical standardization);
ii) To ensure effective co-operation within the Community.
implies, in particular:
a)  Compatibility of the bilateral or multilateral scientific and tecqnological .agree-
ments concluded by States with the unity and interests of the Community;
b)  Harmonization of the existing conditions under which the State collaborates
with industry in research and technology in the various countries (means of providing
assistance - contracts, associations between the State and industry, etc.
c)  Dovetailing of the Member States' procurement policies;
d)  The concerting of scientific programmes, and the alLocation of technological
tasks. .
Such co-operation
156. ' The only field  in which the United Kingdom might have special problems
where these general objectives ate conc:erned is that of bilateral agreements. The
United Kingdom has special ties with. the United States in certain fields of military
and nuclear researc:h. It would be necessary to know how much is covered by
these agreements.
III. Conclusions
157. Where scientific and technological matters are concerned, the United Kingdom
and the Community would seem, at first sight, to be mutually c:omplementary to
some extent. The United Kingdom s indll,strial resources and internal market are
not sufficient to enable it to exploit its scientific and technological assets  to  the
full. In the Community, scientific and technological investment is, in relation to
the resources available, less developed than in the United Kingdom.
The enlargement of the market resulting from the new accessions would create
conditions more advantageous for scientific and technological progress. But it would
be illusory to think that the broadly complementary c:haracters of the United Kingdom
and the Community noted above could automatically result in a division of labour
that would be both ec:onomically and politically satisfactory.
The Communities will be able to benefit from Britain's contribution in these fields
only if they are able to establish a common policy in the field of science and
advanced technologies. Conversely, it would no doubt be easier and more useful
to establish a common policy of this kind for the Seven than for the Six, as in
certain fields the Six would have difficulty in achieving international dimensions without the British contribution. 
In conclusion, the Community s chance, not indeed, of catching up with the United
States in the field of scientific and technological research (including nuclear research),but of reversing the proc:ess by which Europe has more and more leeway to make up,
would be improved by United Kingdom membership. The hope of this process
being reversed will, however, remain a hope unless the Member States of the
enlarged Community are willing to pool their efforts unreservedly).
158. In view of this, the talks with the United Kingdom could aim at achieving:
i) Acceptance of the principle .pf the exc:hange of scientific and technological
knowled~e and of a common research and development policy;
ii) More specific information as to the possible content of a "technological Com-
munity" which would in fact be an extension of the present Communities into the
technological field.TITLE III
ENIA,RGED COMMUNITY AND NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES159. Extension of the Community by the ac:cession of four countries including the
United Kingdom would have important repercussions on relations with non-member
countries. The enlarged Community would be by far the biggest importer in the
world, and its responsibilities, both inside and outside Europe, would be substan-
tially increased. Moreover, provided the Community s cohesion and momentum were
not adversely affected, its greater weight would be likely to expand considerably
its ability to take actioOn at international level.
The most immediate problems concern relations with those member countries of
EFTA which cannot or do not wish to jbin the Community (see Title I) and also relations
with the Commonwealth oountries, given the special links betWeen them. and the
United Kingdom and the existence of an association with African Cbuntries and
Madagascar. The problem of the Commonwealth cannot be isolated from those
raiseq. by relations with the other industrialized or less developed noOn-member
countries.
The present Title, then, after a brief review of the broad c:onsequenc:es that extension
of the CommuJ1ity will have on its relati011s with non-member countries, is devoted
to an examination of the future relatioOns betWeen an enlarged Community and the
various classes of less developed countries and also between the enlarged Community
and those industrialized countries which do not form part of Western Europe.C-' bapter 
General effects on relations with non-member countries
60. Accession of the four countries seeking membetship could turn the Community,
vhose volume of external trade already exceeds that of the United States, into the
oremost commercial power in the world, accounting for 22% of all international
rade, as against 16% for the Six:. Consequently the Community would playa vital
)art in the evolution of international trade.
fhe Community s chief suppliers would experience a considerable increase in their
)ercentage of exports to the Community as a result of acc:ession of the new members
:see table below).
However, the consequences to non-member c:ountries must be .assessed with dl1e regard
~o the stimulating effect which extension of the Community might have on economic
:xpansion in Europe. In this c:onnection the experience of the Six shows that the
impact of the intra-Community preference implicit in the c:ustoms union may in quite
large part be offset by economic: expansion.
161. Nevertheless, urgent appeals are to be expeCted from non-members, especially
but not exclusively the Commonwealth c:ountries; they will be seeking either a further
general reduction of tariffs or preferential concessions or concessions on certain products.
162. If account is taken not only of the fact that the tariffs of the new member coun-
tries and of the United Kingdom in particular are generally higher than the CCT, but
also of the outcome of the recent negotiations in Geneva, the Community should be
able to resist all demands for a new overall reduction in tariffs, at least until completion
of its economic union puts it into a better position to meet international competition.
Nevertheless, the requests of the Commonwealth developing countries are sure to
constitute an urgent problem if the Community is enlarged.Share of the Community in the external trade of a s131ection of
non-member countries or areas in  1965  and  1966
Imp()rts Exp()rts
COuntries ()r areas 1965 1966 1965 1966
in$ m. in % in$ m. in% in$m. in % in$ m. in%
1.  United States
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
2.  Canada
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
3.  Australia
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
4.  New Zealand
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
5.  South Africa
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
6.  Japan
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
7.  Eastern Europe
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
8.  Developing countries
Total
Present Community
Extended Community
21 290
3 327 15.
5 024 23.
25 408
4 100 16.
6 290 24.
27 006
4 906 18.
6 757 25.
29 912
5 268 17.'6
7 261 24.
7 987 130 8 091 9 513
476 510 588 596
105 13. 160 12. I 786 22. 766 18.
3 324 3 245 3 014 3 172
414 12. 404 12. 430 14. 464 14.
I 326 39. I 228 37. 968 32. 968 30.
968 I 006 I 002 I 077
156 15. 159 14.
426 44. 442 43. 650 64. 621 57.
2 461 2 307 I 475 I 668
521 21.2 460 19. 275 18. 312 18.
I 234 50. 107 48. 824 55. 911 54.
8 169 9 522 8 452 9 779
392 448 485 595
581 701 822 991 10.
18 990
I 415 7.
I 891 10.
not yet
available
19 710
I 571 8.
2 386 12.
not yet
available
37 408
7 46'0 19.
II 371 30.
127 960
36 090 28.
41 176 32.Share of the Community in the extl3rnal trade of a selection of
non-member countries or areas in  1965  and  1966  (cont.
Imports Exports
Countries or areas 1965 1966 1965 1966
in $ m. in % in$ m. in % in$m. in % if.  $ m. in%
9.  Latin America
Total 340 100
Present Community 893 20. 769 24.
Extended Community 730 29. 107 37.
10.  Far East
Total 850 310
Present Community 461 11.4 152 12.4
Extended Community 640 20. 241 24.
11.  Middle East
Total 430 490
Present Community 089 24. 2 522 38.
Extended Community 774 40. 479 53.
) Extended Community: Six, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Norway.
Nate:  The data concerning the areas or groups of countries from 7 (Eastern Europe) to 11 (Middle East) inclusive have 
been
computed as "derived figures" in respect of the Community share (both Six and Ten countries), 1.e, Community imports =
exports of these areas or groups of countries and vice versa.Chapter 
Relations with the developing countries
ct) General
163. The Community of the Six already bears J;1eavy responsibilities in the field of
development aid through its association arrangements with a large number of less
developed countries, most of them in Africa.
Extension would cause the Community to expand its activities in the sphere of develop-
ment aid either within or outside the association framework. The wider responsibi-
lities would be due not only to the accession of new members with high living
standards but also to the fact that one of them, the United Kingdom, has in the
Commonwealth complex and often historic links with a large number of less developed
countries.
164. The Commonwealth problems were examined in detail during the negotiations
that were interrupted in 1963. The Commission considers that the arrangements envi-
saged at that time may retain some validity and should be examined case by case.
The closer links established betWeen the EEC and certain Commonwealth countries
the tariff cuts agreed in the Kennedy Round and the autonomous suspensions of
duty applied by agreement between the EEC and the United Kingdom also help to
simplify the problem.
b)  E x te n s ion and the I ink s wit h as s 0 cia t e s (Yaounde and
Commonwealth countries with comparable economic structure and comparable
production)
165. The Community s association arrangements concern at the present time seventeen
African States and Madagascar, all associated under the Yaounde Convention, Nigeria
which has signed the separate Lagos Agreement with the Community, and several
countries or territories outside Europe which are not independent.
A new member of the Community would be required to maintain with the developing
countries relations identical with those now maintail1ed by the Six. Conversely, the
associated developing countries would have to acc:ord any new member the same
treatment as they already accord the ,Six.
In 1962 it was envisaged that the non-independent Commonwealth overseas countries
should be associated on the same terms as the non-independent associated overseas
countries or territories. Correspondingly, those independent Commonwealth countries
whose structure and production are comparable with those of the Yaounde countries
(States in Africa south of the Saha~a and in the Caribbean area) would qualify for
association with the enlarged Community.
In this connection it should be remembered that alongside the trade clauses, financial
and technical co-operation are a key element in the arrangements for the association
of .overseas States, countries and territories with the EEc. The aid given through the
Community represents an appreciable part of the total official aid (multilateral and
bilateral combined) which the Yaounde countries receive from the Six. As an enlargedCommunity could not cease to give some measure .of Community aid in addition 
the bilateral aid provided by the Member States, new members would have to make
their comribution. This aid would be available to all the associates, for manifestly it
would not be possible, among countries of comparable struc:ture and comparable
production, that one group should benefit from technical and financial assistance while another did not. 
Such aid would moreover help to stimulate economic co-ordination between associated
countries, particularly for those countries that have special links with various Member
States.
However, it should be made clear from the Outset that arrangements on trade and
financial and technical assistance could, apart from their application to the Yaounde
countries, be applied only to those Commonwealth developing countries which accepted
the reciprocal rights and obligations entailed in association arrangements with the
EEC: if any of them were unwilling to accept these terms, they c:ould have n.othing
beyond a trade agreement with the Community. The benefits they could enjoy under
such agreements could not be equivalent to those deriving from association agreements.
166. A word should be said in conclusion on the way in which wider association
arrangements might affect the interests of the present associates. Efforts would be
made to attenuate any ill effects by appropriate measures, with due regard to what
the Yaounde countries and the new overseas associates really do export to the enlarged
Community, and also to any new arrangements made at world level, for example
under commodity agreements.
It is already clear that anything which is
some present or future associate will
negotiations.
a sensitive commodity for the ec:onomy of
require special examination, during the
167. A last point is that a timing factor is relevant to the solutions to be envisaged
for the Commonwealth countries in Africa and in the West Indies. It is evident
that the situation for these countries will differ according to whether examination of
what is to follow the expiry .of the Yaounde Convention precedes, runs parallel to
or follows the negotiations with the United Kingdom. This question of timing could
affect not only problems such as preferences or the scale of and methods used for
granting financial aid, but also the actual procedure to be followed in examining
these arrangements.
c)  Relations with the Maghreb countries
168. The need to establish homogeneous community arrangements for trade with
Tunisia, Morocc:o and Algeria would become greater should new countries  particu-
larly the United Kingdom  join the Six.
The difficulties which now beset the Community of the Six  in current or planned
negotiations  in its efforts to grant preferences to agricultural produce from the
Mediterranean area would be eased if the Community consumer market were
widened by the accession of Northern European countries.
Relations with the other less developed countries
169. Extension of the Community, and a larger number of associates would also
raise problems in connection with the .other less developed countries for which asso-
ciation cannot be contemplated.The impact of any extension of the preferenc:es enjoyed by the assodated countries
on the position of the other developing countries, espedally those in Latin America
on the markets of the enlarged Community, will need to be carefully considered.
The remarks made above concerning the implication of an enlarged Community
for the Yaounde countries also apply here.
170. With referenc:e more especially to the Commonwealth countries of Asia, the
agreement contemplated in 1962 could be re-examined by the enlarged Community.
It should however , be noted that these countries have already been granted certain
concessions  autonomous or contractual  by the Community in recent years.
These concessions have solved a number of the problems which had been raised in
the 1962 negotiations. The granting by the industrialized countries  as planned
under UNCTAD  of preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactUres from all
the developing countries could also help to solve the latter s problems.
Imports from Hong Kong pose a spedal probl~m.
171. The enlarged Community should consider what scope there would be for Com-
munity action in the field of financial and technical co-operation for all the developing
countries, particularly these in Latin America.Chapter 
Relations with other non-member countries
172. The relations between an enlarged Community and the developed Commonwealth
countries, the United States, Japan, the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe
are discussed below.
a)  Can a d a , Au s tr a I i a , New Z e a I arid
173. The British Government has not stated that special arrangements are required
for the developed Commonwealth countries, with the exceptioh of New Zealand and
its milk products. This may be explained first of all by the fact that the relative
importance of exports from these countries to the United Kingdom is diminishing, 
the table below shows:
Exports from developed Commo'1'lwealth countfies to the United Kingdom
(as  of exports to all countries)
Country 1938 1953 1960 1963
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
37.
54.
83.4
16.
37.
67.
17.
26.
53.
13.
17.4
48.
Moreover, the elimination of Commonwealth preferences once the United Kingdom
applies the CCT will be made easier by the results of the Kennedy Round.
In these circumstances, the removal of Commonwealth preferences should not present
insurmountable difficulties if it takes place progressively over a transitional period and
so enables th(: necessary adjustments to he made.
The long-term solutions to the problems of the main agricultural commodities can be
found only in a world context. If necessary the Community could take further steps
to bring to a successful conclusion the efforts it was making in the Kennedy Round
to establish world agreements on trade in certain agricultural commodities.
b)  The United States
174. Where the United States is concerned, an examination of commercial problems
alone would not be enough. For the Community, whether it has six members or more
the United States will be a partner which, because of its size, will be of exceptional
importance. The accession of several States, and of the United Kingdom in particular
would mean that the Community could hope, as a result of its increased dimensions
See Chapter on agriculture.to have one day a potential comparable with that of the United States or, at least, that
the gap between Europe and the United States would not grow wider. The Commu-
nity would then have better chances of putting the relations between Europe and
Americ:a on a footing of equality.
These chances would, however, come to nought if extension of the Community meant
that it could not fully safeguard or indeed reinforce its cohesion and its readiness to
take decisions and act upon them.
c)  Japan
175. On the basis of 1966 figures, exports from Japan to the Community would rise
from $595 million to $991 million (or from 6% to 10% of Japan s total exports);
imports from the Community would go up from $448 million to $701 million (or from
7% to 7.4% of Japan s total imports).
The greater importance of relations with Japan would make it even more necessary
than before for the old and the new members of the Community to agree on a common
commerdal policy towards this c:ountry (See Title II, Chapter 1 (d).
d)  USSR and the Eastern European countries
176. The tendency to establish closer economic: links between the Community and
the c:ountries of Eastern Europe might be strengthened by the extension of the
Community: the enhanced importance of the wider Community as a trading partner
could well induce the USSR and the other Eastern European countries to take 
objective look at the advantages that would stem from contact with the Community.
Care would nevertheless have to be taken that the development of trading relations
with these countries did not take place in extended order; if each of the old or new
Member States tried to obtain individual advantages, the consequences could be damag-
ing for the Community. For this reason, the elaboration of a common commercial
policy towards Eastern Europe should not be postponed during the period of accession
negotiations and should be accepted by the new members. It does not, however
seem that extension is likely to cause additional difficulties in this sphere. Harmoniza-
tion of the Member States' polides towards the Eastern European countries was begun
a few years ago and the lines followed have been much the same as those previously
adopted by the United Kingdom.TITLE IV
INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS177. In the Commission s view the need to maintain and if possible to strengthen in
the enlarged Community the efficacy and the role of the institUtional machinery
set up by the Treaties is of prime importance. This matter has been discussed in
Title I, which deals with the general problems that would be raised by extension
of the Community.
The purpose of the present Title is therefore essentially confined to examining such
institutional adjustments as would necessarily be involved in the ac:cession of other
States. These questions cannot be' stUdied in detail until an advanced stage of the
negotiations: the solutions to be envisaged depend on the number and relative
importance of the States which join the Communities and on whether the various
accession Treaties come into force simultaneously or one at a time.
For these reasons the Commission must c.onfine itself in the present Title to a preli-
minary outline of the problems raised. The possibility that the new members might
join the Community one at a time has been provisionally disregarded for the reasons
indicated in Title 1
The specific legal and constitutional implications of United Kingdom membership are
also examined at the end of the present Title.
a)  The P a r1 i a ill e n t
178. The extension of the Community would lead to an increase in the number of
members in the European Parliament.
The distribution of seats among the representatives of the peoples of the Member
States that compose the Community should be re-examined at that time.
b)  The Co u n d I
179. Extension raises two main adjustment problems: the size of the qualified major~
ity .and the weighting of Members' votes.
With regard to the size of the qualified majority, there is no reason to depart from
the principle of the two-thirds majority required in practice by the present Treaties.
There is however a problem concerning decisions which, under the Treaties, do not
have to be taken on a proposal from the Commission. Article 148(2) of the EEC
Treaty specifies that the two-thirds majority necessary for such decisions must include
the votes of at least four member countries. In a Community of 10 member oountries
this provision would have to be adapted in such a way as to preserve the wider
Community s ability to act.
180. The accession of new States raises a further problem which, although not
directly related to the efficacy .of the institutions, would stem from the accession of
four new States of greatly differing population  that of balance in the representation
of the different Member States. Account should be taken of the accession of three
States whose populations each represent at most half of those of the Netherlands or
of Belgium; the weighting of votes in the enlarged Community should therefore be reviewed. c)  The Com m i s s ion
181. An increase of the number of members in the Commission after extension
of the Community wiQuld raise not only the question of the need to maintain the
efficiency of the Community s machinery, but a problem of balance which should be
dealt with during the negotiations.
d)  The Court iQf Justice
182. The accession of new members raises virtUally no problems for this institution. ,
When, however, changes are made care should be taken to ensure that, inacco,rdance
with the Protocol of the Statute of the Court, the number of judges is kept uneven.
e)  Budgetary contributions and special weightings
183. Since this problem is linked with that of th~ fair distribution of financial
burdens in the enlarged Community, it is probably too early to envisage possible
solutions at the present stage. The questions raised by the weightings connected
with Member States' budget contributions will have to be solved in the course of the
negotiations, with due regard to the individual situations of the new members.
In view of the European Coal and Steel Communitys levy system and of its funds
for special purposes, arrangements to cover this field will have to be worked out
during the negotiations. 
f)  Leg a I and con  tit uti 0 n a I imp I i cat ion s 0 f Un i t e d Kin 
g -
dom accession
184. The differences between the United Kingdom legal system and the systems
of the Six justify raising the question of how Community law can be applied in the
United Kingdom, even though the British Government has recognized that accession
involves the acceptance by the new Member State of Community law (Treaty .and
existing and futUre Community acts).
185. The general principles of its criminal law and the system of common law are
the two main pecularities which distinguish law in the United Kingdom from law in
the Community. These would, however, be virtually unaffected by Community law.
In those matters where Community law applies, the situation in the United Kingdom
does not appear to differ essentially from that of the Member States. Membership
of the Community would no doubt mean that United Kingdom law had to be adapted
in certain respects to Community law, and that the Community would in future
have to keep certain pecularities of United Kingdom law in mind, particularly in
connectiiQn with harmonization of the law in certain fields such as recognition and
execution of judgments, company law, etc.
186. The problems involved in establishing the conditions under which Community
law will have its full legal effect in the United Kingdom do not in fact differ ,
character from those already encoutered by the present Member States.
187.  In  addition, the transfer to the Community of certain legislative powers, as is
required by the Treaty, can be validly effected in the Act of Parliament ratifying the
80'Treaty, with the consequences this entails for the legislative activity ofParliamenr
(adoption of measures required by Community law, present and future; avoidance of
measures incompatible with Community law). The United Kingdom Government
while recognizing that subordination of munic:ipal law to Community law which is directly enforceable constitutes an unprecedented innovation in United Kingdom constitutional law, considers that this can be accepted as a consequence of ratification of the Treaty by Parliament.
188. With regard to the prerogatives of the Court of Justice of the Communities notably in the matter Gf control over the interpretation and implementation of Com-
munity law, the United Kingdom Government has emphasized the importance of the right to call for preliminary rulings (under Art. 177) from the Court of Justice as an aid to the implementation of Community law by the United Kingdom legal authorities.
189. In conclusion, the United Kingdom Government is aware that legislative action on a large scale would be necessary to give effect in the United Kingdom to the Community law already in force at the time of accession.countries, particularly the Commonwealth countries (these ate urgent problems which
would assume new forms through the 
very fact of extension of the Community).
193. To sum up, the new membership applications are impelling the Community
to tac:kle at one and the same time the problems involved in its development and
those involved in its extension. Opinions differ as to the priority to be given to
the one or the other of these objectives. The best way of overc:oming the difficulty
would be to try to attain them both simultaneously. But, if this difficult operation
is to be successfully concluded, it is'essential that extension should not hamper the
pursuit of the normal ac:tivities of the Communities and should not subsequendy
entail weakening of their cohesion or their dynamism, espedally where the establish-
ment of economic union, the requisite measureS of harmonization and the functioning
of the institutional machinery are concerned.
The Commission is well aware that the cohesion and dynamism of the Communities
depend to a great extent on the convergence of national polides 
in the essential fields.
If full advantage is to be taken of the opportunities which extension opens up for the
Community, it is apparent that Member States should within a reasonable period be
in a position to make progress along the road to political union.
194. It follows from all the considerations set forth in this document that the Com-
missi~n is not at present in possession of all the information needed to give in
final form the Opinion requested by tbe Council under Article 98 of the Treaty of
Paris and under Articles 237 and 205 of the Treaties of Rome. Choices of
considerable importance for any appraisal of the impac:t which the new members 'Would
have on the Community are still to be made. The general conclusions which would
enable the Commission to give a final Opinion cannot be drawn until it knows the
position of the candidate States on a number of essential problems, the attitudes
which will in consequence be adopted by the present Member States, and the solutions
which may be adopted to the main problems discussed in this document.
It is the Commission s Opinion that, in order to dispel the unc:ertainty which still
attaches in particular to certain fundamental points, negotiations should be opened in
the most appropriate forms with the States which have applied for membership, in
order to examine in more detail, as is indeed necessary, the problems brought out in
this document and to see whether arrangements can be made under which the 
indis-
pensable cohesion and dynamism will be maintained in an enlarged Community.190. Analysis of the chief problems involved in the extension .of the Community
reveals that the acc:ession of new members such as Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway,! whose political and economic structures and level of development are very dose to those of the present Member States, could both strengthen the Com- munity and afford it an opportunity for further progress, provided the new members accept the provisions of the Treaties and the decisions taken subsequently 
- .
and this they have said they are disposed to do. Their access~on, although it would bring great changes with it, would not then be likely to modify the fundamental
objectives and individual features of the European CommuClities or the methods they use. 
191. The Commission wishes to restate the conditions which would have toO be fulfilled if extension is to take place in a satisfactory manner.
First, the new members would, as a general rule have to accept the arrangements
adopted by the founder members before extension, subject to any exceptional adjust- ments that may be made. In particular, they would have to accept:
i) The Community customs tariffs as they emerge from the recent multilateral nego- tiations in GATT, and their gradual application to all non-member countries along with all the rules necessary for the proper functioning of the customs union.
ii) The basic principles of the common policies with the provisions for their imple- mentati.oCl, particularly in the economic, financial, social and agricultural fields, and their gradual application.
iii) The contractual obligations of the Communities towards non-member countries (assodation agreements, trade agreements, etc.).
iv) The institutional machinery of the Communities as established by the Treaties and the decisions taken in application of the Treaties, subject only to those adjustments rendered necessary by the accession of new States; these adjustments will have to be designed so that the institutions shall continue to be sufficiently effective and that a suitable balance is maintained in the representation of the various Member States.
192. In addition, the new members, espedally the main one, the United Kingdom
would have to agree with the founder members on the solution of a number of problems which would be of vital importance for the harmonious development of an enlarged Community:
i) Restoration of lasting equilibrium in the British economy and its balance of payments, entailiClg concerted action between Great Britain and the member countries of the Community, and examination of ways and means of adjusting the present inter- national role of sterling so that the pound could be fitted
, together with the currencies of the other member countries, iClto a Community monetary system.
ii) The principle of a common policy in the field .of research and technology, including atomic energy, and the general lines such a policy should follow;
Iii) Financing of the Community s overall activities, including the agricultural policy;
iv) The relations to be established with those European countries  notably any EFTA countries which do not join the Community  and with the less developed
1 As regards Sweden, see see. 35 of Title 